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ABSTRACT
This thesis deals directly with the problem of exclu-
siveness within the tourist resort areas in Jamaica. In
dealing with this problem the author does not feel that a
mere discussion of the problem is merited, but feels that
if this thesis is to be of any vital importance to this
subject then strategies for minimizing the problem ought to
be presented.
It was not possible for a comprehensive set of strat-
gies for minimizing exclusiveness to be presented in this
thesis. Consequently, only physical planning strategies are
presented but, as the author mentions, there need to be
other aspects of planning (such as economic planning) for
aiding in the minimizing of exclusiveness.
In the first chapter of this thesis a discussion of
the historical developemnt of the tourist industry in 5am-
aica is presented. Some reference is also given of the
historical development of the tourist resort areas.
Some evidence of exclusiveness within Jamaica's resort
areas is presented in the second chapter. In this chapter
the term "exclusiveness" is also defined.
For this thesis to be of any signifiance reasons have
to be given for identifying exclusiveness as an important
topic for discussion. In Chapter Three reasons from educa-
tional, sociological and economic standpoints are presented
for minimizing exclusiveness.
In Chapter Four a description of a resort city, Monte-
go Bay, is given for which a recent plan has been developed.
iv
This contemporary plan which is geared towards resort de-
lopment is herein unveiled and some evidence of exclusive-
ness is given. The reason for including this chapter is
to show that some reputable planners today are still design-
ing resort areas which are inherently "exclusive".
The final chapter is a presentation of some physical
planning strategies which are stated quite generally and are
geared primarily for virgin areas or areas cleared through,
for example, urban renewal. How some of these strategies
can be employed and implemented in one of Jamaica's existing
resort areas, Montego Bay, conclude the chapter.
Thesis Supervisor: Gary Hack
Title: Assistant Professor of Architecture and Urban Design
Thesis Supervisor: William A. Southworth
Title: Lecturer in Environmental Psychology
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INTRODUCTION
Jamaica is an independent country which is located
about ninety miles south of Cuba in the Caribbean Sea.
It is the largest of the English-speaking Caribbean
islands having a total land area of approximately 4,411
square miles. Its two million people are governed under
a democratic political system which is patterned quite
closely to that of BritAin which ruled it for over three
hundred years while it was a colony.
This West Indian island is one of the most popular of
the tourist resort countries in the Caribbean being among
such perennial leaders as the Bahamas, Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands. It has managed to hold such popularity
among North Americans although, unlike the tourist indus-
tries of the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands which receive
significant economic gains from the influence of Florida
and Puerto Rico respectively, its tourist industry opera-
tes without any significant contribution from the other
Caribbean islands.
This thesis may be viewed superficially as an echo of
the protests being made by those victims of the policies
which alienate them fromitout-ist areas but goes much fur-
ther in offering recommendations for the amelioration of
2the problem. Furthermore, this thesis should not be view-
ed as being useful only to Jamaica but to the other
tourist resort islands of the Caribbean whose citizens
have been voicing the same type of protest as Jamaicans.
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CHAP. 1: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TOURISM IN
JAMAICA,
5THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TOURISM IN JAMAICA.
It cannot be stated with any degree of certainty
when the tourist industry commenced in Jamaica as
colonialists were visiting the island ever since the Ara-
waks discovered it. In the years prior to 1890 there
was no formal organization of the tourist industry al-
though there were a few lodging houses and inns at that
time for off-island tourists. Soon the demand for tour-
ist accommodation began to outstrip the supply. It was
around this time (1890) that there was official recogni-
tion of this fact. Then, the Governor of Jamaica, Sir
Henry Blake, made the following remarks:-
"The only accommodation for travellers was
the hospitality freely offered by the coun-
try gentlemen to those who were fortunate
enough to obtain introductions"1.
It was in 1890 that the first sign of an effort ap-
peared to alleviate the disparity between the supply and
demand. With the staging of the Jamaica International
Exhibition the following year, the Government passed the
Jamaica Hotels Law which provided an incentive to hotel
construction in the form of low interest rates (3%)2 on
the capital which it guaranteed.
Before the end of the nineteenth century, hotels
6were springing up in such towns as Kingston, Spanish Town,
Moneague, Mandeville, and the cradle of Jamaica's tourism,
Port Antonio, which was graced by a magnificent hotel
called the Titchfield (see Figure 1.1). Still, there was
no businesslike coordination within the industry.
The informal and laissez faire operation of the tour-
ist industry changed, to some extent, in 1922 when the
Government established a coordinator and promoter called
the Tourist Trade Development Board? The Board was annu-
ally given a small grant to disseminate information about
the island's tourist facilities and make arrangements with
hotels and shipping companies. Foremost among the latter
was the United Fruit Company which was responsible for
transporting Jamaica's banana export to the United States.
It was a catalyst in the expansion of tourism as it en-
couraged Americans to utilize the empty spaces on board
its ships travelling to Jamaica. So, in a sense, the
Board functioned similarly to a travel agency.
It was a little after the establishment of the Tour-
ist Trade Development Board that Montego Bay began to de-
velop as a resort area. The other principal resort area
in Jamaica at the present time, Ocho Rios, did not show
its face until about 1948. It was then that another
Negril
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8beautiful hotel, Tower Isle, was opened there.
The major change is the island's tourist industry oc-
cured in 1955 when the Government replaced the Tourist
Trade Developemnt Board with the Jamaica Tourist Baard
which is still in operation today. Besides getting annual
grants from the Government for its operation, the Tourist
Board was given special powers to borrow money. With jet
travel becoming firmly established and the equipping of
two airports strategically located with respect to the re-
sort areas to accommodate the jetliners, the Tourist Board
began a campaign to tap the tourist market in foreign cen-
tres. Consequently, offices were set up in New York,
Miami, Chicago, Washington, Los Angeles, London, and Tor-
onto.
Accompanying this development was a revision of the
Hotels Aid Law which made it easier for investors to build
hotels. This law was another injection into the economic
bloodstream of the industry as the expansion of tourist
accommodation was encouraged through the tax incentives
provided by the Government.
Since its inception, the Tourist Board has been grow-
ing in strength. Its annual grant grew from J$100,0004 in
1955-56 to J$6.7 million in 1972-73.6
9Furth~rmore, partly through the work of the Tourist
Board tourist arrivals here increased from 161,400 in 1951
8to k93 488 'in 1972. Concomitantly, tourists' expenditures
rose from J$17.8 million9 to J$107.9 million10 during the
same period. Figure 1,2 further illuminates the picture.
Tourist accommodation shows a similiar pattern of
growth. The number of beds reported for 1956 was 3,60011
and according to the Tourist Board this figure grew stead-
ily to 17,944 in 1972.12 The annual growth in tourist ac-
commodation is depicted in Figure 1.3.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HOTELS
It has been mentioned previously in this chapter that
hotels were initially located in Kingston, Spanish Town,
Moneague, Mandeville, and Port Antonio. Observation of
Figure 1.1 shows that all these towns, with the exception
of Kingston and Port Antonio, are inland.
There was no strong importance attached to beaches
at the inception of the tourist industry, thus hoteliers
found it much more profitable to locate within or near to
the existing principal towns. Besides, in an era when
transportation was limited due to a lack of enough roads
and motor vehicles, there was no incentive for the hote-
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13
lier to locate their hotels any place else but the popular
towns. Generally though, hotels were not located in the
heart of the towns but on prominent sites where the view
was all-encompassing and at some comfortable distance from
the hub of the towns.
The hotels in themselves were epitomes of exclusive-
ness. Since they were built with a rich clientele in mind,
the Jamaican of average or even above average income could
not afford to spend even a day there. At that time most
Jamaicans did not know what the inside of a hotel looked
like except for the domestic workers who were employed by
the hotels. Furthermore, at that time, social and colour
prejudice was at its height and therefore the management
of a hotel would find ways of maximizing the separation
between its guests, who were usually affluent whites, and
its employees, who were mostly Blacks of low income.
Hotels were always designed to satisfy all the
general needs (i.e. sleeping and eating) of its guests.
There was no need at that time to spend a lot on recreat-
ional facilities as most of the guests were middle-aged
and preferred to sit, read, and converse with fellow
guests. The desire to go beyond the hotel grounds was
not as strong as today.
14
Hotels were designed in the architectural tradition
of the time and as a result did not stand out militantly
but were an integral part of the total environment. They
were much more tropical and intimate in design than is the
present case.
It was not until after World War II that a definite
change in terms of location and design occurred in Jamaica's
hotels. It was also around this time that resort areas de-
veloped--when tourist facilities were grouped together. No
longer did hoteliers find inland towns most attractive for
siting their hotels but preferred the coastal areas which
were graced with graceful beaches. Tourists were no longer
stressing only facilities for sleeping, eating, and quiet-
ude. Beach facilities became quite an important priority.
Resort areas developed primarily because the hoteliers
were scrambling for the best beaches and the economic bene-
fits of-conglomeration were lucrative due to the subsequent
economies of scale. Figure 1.4 shows the present location
of Jamaica's resort areas. If this is compared with Fi-
gure 1.1 then the locational change becomes evident.
The rapid development in transportation allowed hotels
to be located outside of towns, The North Coast is an ex-
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ample of such location as hotels are sited in the inter-
stitial spaces along the coast between the coastal towns.
THE TOURISTS
Due to the close proximity of Jamaica to the United
States of America, it is not surprising to realize that
most of the island's tourists are permanent residents of
that country.
Table 1.1 shows that during the period between 1968
and 1972 13 no less than 77.2 per cent of Jamaica's long-
stay" tourists14 were permanent residents of the United
States. Although the Tourist Board has recently embarked
upon a campaign to promote Jamaica in ,:urope.an cities there
has-not been any solid growth in tourist arrivals from
there. However, there is still optimism and this optimism
is rising principally because the national airline, Air
Jamaica, has just opened a direct route from London to
Montego Bay and Kingston.
The general trend seem to suggest that the tourist
population constitutes a much higher percentage of young
people than in previous years. Table 1.2 indicates the
declining trend (in terms of percentage) of tourists
thirty-six years and over in age.
AGE DISTRIBUTION AND SEX OF STOP-OVERS
19/70
Under 20 years
20- 35 years
36-' 45 years
46- 55 years
Over 55 years
SEX
MALE
FEMALE
No.
35,594
103,574
62,879
58,284
No.
11.6
33.8
20.5
19.0
No. NoO.
28,967 11.0 24,092 9.7 20,823
86,681 32.8 81,763 32.8
55,132 20.9 52,074 20.9
50,925 19.3 49,231 19.8
72,316
49,618
4.6,401
No.
9.1 19,624 8.6
31.6 70,968 31. 1
21.7 51,096 22.4
20.3 46,744 20.5
46224 151 27 16.1 42,071 16.9 39,681 17.3 39,709 17.4
306,555 100.0 264,232 100.0 249,231 100.0 228,839 100.0 228,141 100.0
163,269 53.3 139,228 52.7 128,809 51.7 118,874 51.9 118,025 51.7
143,286 46.7 125,004 47.3 120,422 48.3 109,965
100.0 264,232 100.0 249,231 100.0 228,839 100.0 228,839
NOTE: 1. The above figures exclude arrivals by air charter on which these data were not available
Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics, 1972
306,555 100.0
TABLE- i1:1
SOURCE:*
TABLE t.2: COMPOSITION OF TOURISTS BY PERMANENT RESIDENCE
LONG STAY
1968
No.
1969
No. No. 0/ No.
( 1968- 1972)
1972
No.
Americans
Canadians
Europeans
Others
186,887
23,472
14,'221
1p,381
239,961
77.9
9.8
5.9
6.4
100
197,401
25,828
13,495
18,9)57
255,681
77.2 224,035
10.1 23,775
5.3 14,533
7.4
100 281,616
80.0 269,579 81.4
8.4 26,843 8.1
5.2 14,445 4.14
6.4
100
2 L9 6.1
331,086 100
290,986 77.7
36,674 9B
23,422 6,3
2 3 62
374,623 100
SHORT STAY
Americans
Canadians
Europeans
Others
14,903
1,054
813
1,729
18, 499
8o.6
5.7
4.3
9.4
16,739 78.8 21,654
1,273
923
2,313
21,248
6.0
4.3
1,389
1,410
78.7 22,881 81.o
5.1
5
10.9 03 1.127,506
1,322
1,220
4.6
4.3
2,814 1
28,237
25,205 759
1'657 5D
1,777 5i5
3,813-.733,181-
Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics, 1972SOURCE:
'-a
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Most of the tourists visit Jamaica when the winter
descends on their home countries. As a result, Jamaica's
tourist industry suffers economically from the "seasonal-
ity". The tourist season manifest two peaks--a short one
which commences in July and lasts for two months, and a
longer period which begins in November and ends in April.
Refer to Table 1.3 which displays the seasonality of tour,-.
ism.
Between 1967 and 1972, most of the tourists would be
classified as "long-stay" visitors as most of them remain-
ed for over seven nights. 15 Table 1.4 shows a monthly
breakdown of the average duration of tourists visits.
Jamaica has had a reputation of attracting almost ex-
clusively wealthy tourists.16 Although there is some
change in the economic status of the tourists arriving in
the recent past, there is still a relatively significant
percentage of affluent visitors. There are .no real data
to confirm this in Jamaica's case but realizing that the
type of tourists to the other Caribbean islands is no dif-
ferent from Jamaica, Table 1.5 may be offered as corroba-
tion.
T A B L E
HOTEL: ROOM AND BED NICHTS SOLD AND PERCENTA/E OCCU?.ATCY BY MONTH, BY AREA
ROOM HIGHTS SOLD
1972 1971 1970 1969 1968
Jan. 95423 03343 81920 92420 87118
Feb. 117541 111004 100634 91124 88927
Mar. 109674 95535 94831 79872 78443
Apr. 92536 90916 68362 82169 65231
May 67317 73030 57090 46196 67754
June 60817 64800 56859 42724 48425
July 91387 94065 71832 72054 77857
Aug. 105156 103197 81126 67091 69863
Sept. 60762 54509 52942 40022 37399
Oct. 67678 59536 53505 57885 51887
Nov. 97481 84533 72134 62963 65539
Dec. 103551 91430 '85114 86084 66035
J A M A I C A
PERCENTAGE OCCUPA
BED NIGHTS SOLD ROOMS
1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1972 1971 1970 1969 1968 1972
175022 149120 147296 170731 158041 54.7 50.7 61.4
218891 204283 187466 169870 164580 70.0 73.5 80.9
205047 171874 177136 146830 145613 59.8 57.4 68.2
173303 172442 119460 152615 122583 51.0 56.6 50.7
119645 126288 97189 79455 119120 35.7 44.2 41.0
124486 113239 96734 75348 86284 37.4 40.7 38.5
171941 172658 139099 132412 143176 48.2 57.2 46.7
198358 194639 148005 124985 130481 55.7 62.1 52.6
103828 87181 87908 68402 62424 33.3 34.4 35.4
116020 102295 90439 100216 88075 35.8 35.9 34.3
168971 147749 124303 100925 115690 53.0 52.4 47.0
192192 171739 159368 161844 122700 54.6 53.6 52.4
73.5
89.5
77.8
65.0
48.7
45.2
59.2
68.0
43.5
49.3
60.3
60.1
YEAR f77323 D05948 876349 820604 804478 1967704 1313507 1574403 M93633 1458767 48.9 51.5 50.1 62.1 66.8 45.3 46.3 46.2 58.7 63.0
73.8
91.6
79.4
67.0
60.6
56.6
69.5
76.4
43.1
47.0
69.4
67.4
51.1
66.2
57.1
48.5
32.3
34.4
46. 1
53.3
28.9
30.9
46.2
51.0
UTCY
BEDS
1971 1970 1969 1968
46.4 56.9 70.4 69.7
69.4 77.5 86.2 88.4
52.6 65.0 74.1 76.7
54.7 45.1 62.7 65.7
38.9 35.7 43.7 55.3
28.4 33.6 41.4 52.4
53.4 46.5 56.4 66.2
59.6 49.4 65.8 73.9
28.0 30.3 38.8 38.5
31.6 29.8 44.5 41.7
46.7 41.4 55.2 63.5
51.4 50.0 58.6 64.7
Source: Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics-1972.
O
T A B
AVERAGE LENGTH OF
L E 1.4
STAY (NIGHTS)
MONTH
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
YEAR
1972
8.3
8.4
8.6
7.6
7.0
7.9
9.3
9.2
6.4
6.4
7.7
7.9
1971
9.2
8.1
8.4
8.3
7.1
7.1
7.9
8.3
8.4
6.8
8.6
7.8
8.1
1970
9.5
9.0
9.0
8.2
6.8
6.8
7.9
9.3
8.8
6.5
6.0
77
8.1
1969 1968
9.7
9.6
10.1
9.3
8.4
7.2
8.2
10.0
6.0
6.5
6.6
8.1
8.5
9.6
9.4
9.8
9.2
7.7
8.0
7.8
8.9
9.3
6.8
7.0
8.5
8.5
SOURCE: Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics-1972
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1967
9.3
10.0
10.0
9.8
8.5
5.2
8.3
9.1
10.7
6.6
7.2
8.1
8.6
22
Table 1.5: Characteristics of the Caribbean Travellers
of American Airlines' Routes
Mainland-Ba gauan,
Puerto Rico
1972 1973
Summer Winter
Netherland Antilles
& the Virgin Islands
1972 1973
Summer Winter
Family Income
(before taxes)
Under $10 ,000 (b) 29$10,000-14,999 19
$15,000-19,999 19
$20,000-29,999 19
$30,000 and over 14
Occupation
Executive/Managerial
12
Professional 18
Housewife 8
Student 16
Teacher/Professor 10
Office worker 19
Crafts/Mech./
Service 5
Government/Mili-
tary 4
Retired 1
All other 7
(a) Excludes Puerto Rican "ethnic"
(b) In United States dollars
travellers
Source: D.E. Lundberg, "Caribbean Tourism: Vital to the
Economy but Mismanaged?" in The Cornell Etel and
Restaurant Administration Quarer , February 1974,
% 13%
20
15
22
30
24%
19
18
21
18
23
17
15
9
9
10
4
9%
16
16
23
36
25
16
20
6
10
7
4
2
3
7
15
17
13
13
15
9
6
3
2
7
3
2
8
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THE IMPORTANCE OF TOURISM TO JAMAICA'S ECONOMY
The tourist industry earns the highest amount of for-
eign exchange for the island after the bauxite industry.
In 1968, for example the tourist industry earned J$73.2
million while the bauxite industry earned J$88.8 million
for the same year.17 Table 1.6 shows that the earnings of
the tourist industry rose from J$28.8 million in 1966 to
J$107.9 million in 1972.18 Though not all of these earn-
ings remain in the island--the Tourist Board has estimated
that only sixty-six per cent remain--they represent quite
an important percentage of the income the island makes
from its exports.
The earnings of foreign exchange is very important
and especially so when there are so many fluctuations in
the international monetary system as is the present case.
Tourism goes a long way in alleviating some of the
severity of Jamaica's unemployment problem. The unemploy-
ment rate has risen from 13.5 per cent in 1960 to 22.5
per cent in 1972 and as Professor Norman Girvan has
noted:-
"...While the growth of Jamaica's national
income has been spectacular, it has not
resulted in proportional increases in the
number of jobs; and this in spite of the
breathing space afforded by enormous mi-.
24
TABLE 1.6: TOURIST EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENTAGE
OF EXPORT EARNINGS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tourist Expendi-
tures (J$million)
13.4
28.8
46.4
56.0
57.8
73.2
77.9
79.6
90.8
107.9
Export Column (2) as a
Receipts Percentage of
(J$million) Column (3)
66.6
113.4
153.0
196.2
196.8
207.1
243.7
283.1
283.9
300.3
20.4
25.5
30.3
28.6
29.4
35.4
32.0
28.2
32.0
27.8
Source: 1. National Planning Agency, Economic Survey,
Jamaica 1972.
2. Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics 1972.
3. Owen Jefferson, The Post-War Economic
Development of Jamaica.
Year
1955
1960
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
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gration to Britian". 19
Thus, the employment picture seems to be getting dimmer
and dimmer every passing moment.20
According to a recent Government survey, 9,580 per-
sons were directly employed in hotels, guest houses, cot-
tages and apartments,2 1 This figure, though small in com-
parison to the sugar industry,22 is much higher than that
in the bauxite-alumina industry. Furthermore, according
to the same survey, the direct employment in the tourist
industry represents about 1.5 per cent of the nation's
total employed labour force.
Though the direct employment generated by tourism
seems minimal according tothe figures cited, tourism pro-
vides employmeint in regions away from the capital city.
Thus some of the migration from the rural areas is being
absorbed by the resort areas which because of their stra-
tegic locations (see Figure 1.4) also serve to distribute
employment and hence income.
Besides direct employment, the industry includes in-
direct employment. The indirect employment is difficult
to measure. Various figures are given for the ratio be-
tween direct and indirect employment in the industry.
One source says there is a 1:1 ratio, 23 while another be-
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lieves that this ratio is more of the order of 2:3.24
Furthermore, it has been reported that at the present time
there is an average of 1.2 employees for every hotel room.5
This means that the tourist industry probably indi-
rectly employed between 12,370 and 19,160 persons during
the 1972 season.26 This indeed is a significant number
and is of more relevance than the direct employment figure
in an analysis of the degree of employment generated by the
industry.
Inducing indirect or external employment is an impor-
tant economic effect of tourism because those persons who
are underskilled or overskilled to work directly in the
tourist industry or whose occupational skills (as far as
direct or internal employment is concerned) are irrelev-
ant can benefit through associated employment. Thus,
roads leading to or within resort areas have to be built
and maintained which means that civil engineers, contrac-
tors, manual labourers, and others are employed. Electri-
city and water have to be supplied. These needs open jobs
for such individuals as electricians, plumbers, etc. En-
vironmental quality needs to be achieved resulting in the
employment of gardeners, sanitation employees, and others
including store operators who may supply items such as
27
gardening tools. Additionally, people who would never
make a decent livelihood if tourism did not exist, such
as craftsmen and artists, would have to translate their
vocation into an avocation.
Tourism further fuels the economy as it is a source
of tax revenues. Each tourist pays direct taxes on his or
her hotel room. Indirectly (s)he pays taxes also on every
item of consumer good (s)he purchases. It was estimated
that in 1972 room tax and the indirect tax amounted to
J$887,000 and J$665,000 respectively.2 7
As far as the future economy of the island is con-
cerned, tourism, if it continues to grow at its present
rate, may reap even a higher percentage of the total re-
ceipts from exports since the various agricultural indus-
tries have been declining. Although the bauxite-alumina
industry will through new progressive Governmental legis-
lation increase its receipts from approximately J$25 mil-
lion in 1973 to just over J$200 million this year, partly
because of the recent formation of the International Bau-
xite Association,28 tourism will still be important and
probably even more so.
It has been predicted (based on reports furnished by
the various bauxite companies) that Jamaica's bauxite will
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be exhausted within the next fifty years--that is, within
the next two generations. This means that Jamaica cannot
afford to stand idly by and allow the tourist industry to
decline, especially at a time when there is every indica-
tion of a bright and prosperous future.
There are strong indications that international tour-
ism will continue to grow. Although tourism is affected
by wars, civil strifes, and econ6mic recessions and depres-
sions, the painful blows most likely would not last indefi-
nitely because modern man is becoming more and more mobile.
One reason for this is the relatively low cost of travel on
international airlines. 29 International travel is viewed in
the technologically more developed societies as some event
which everyone should experience at least once during his
or her lifetime.
According to the most recent study published, Jamai-a
ca's tourist industry should grow from its annual reception
of 374,700 long-stay tourists in 1972 30 to over two million
long-stay tourists in 1990.31 In this study it was further
announced that:-
"...With the present long-stay tourist/bed
ratio of 25.1 this would require 88,900
tourist beds--the equivalent of 44,250
hotel rooms--eight times the present ac-
commodation.
29
Although the above forecasts of tourist
arrivals and accommodation requirements
over the next twenty years may seem far-
fetched at present, examination of the
combined private and public proposals
for major new tourism projects in Jam.-
aica demonstrates that six known major
schemes could, at the time of full de-
velopment, provide a total of 86,000
tourist beds.
It seems very clear...that Jamaica al-
ready has a generous reserve of land for
tourism and this -reserve will probably
be more than adequate for the next twen-
ty years". 32
As far as employment is concerned, the same report
predicts that about 65,000 additional jobs would be gen-
erated by the growth in tourism in 1990.33 This figure
was based on the assumption that the then present (1969)
direct hotel employment ratio of 1.2 employees per hotel
room would decline to 0.7 by 1990 but that the ratio of
external employee to internal employee for direct employ-
3n
ment would remain 1.5.
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CHAP. 2: EVIDENCE OF EXCLUSIVENESS IN THE RESORT AREAS
31
Now that the historical development of Jamaica's
tourist industry has been traced from its infancy to the
present time when it is a full-fledged industry, Jamaicans
should not be overly confident about its future. One
reason for saying this is that there is a disturbing char-
acteristic which is haunting the industry. This character-
istic is "exclusiveness" and it will be the topic of con-
cern in this chapter.
In order to delimit or eradicate any confusion in the
discussions of this chapter, it becomes appropriate for a
definition of "exclusiveness" to be made.
In this thesis "exclusiveness" is defined from two
angles: (1) exclusiveness in terms of exclusion, voluntary
or involuntary; (2) exclusiveness in terms of privilege.
Therefore, in the first case "exclusiveness" is to be in-
terpreted as having the tendency or power to exclude a
segment of a society, the poor, from the tourist areas and
facilities which it would like to experience. In the sec-
ond case, "exclusiveness" is making the tourists, in con-
tradistinction to the average Jamaican, a privileged
group. For example, if the needs of the tourists always
or most often override the similar needs of the citizenry,
or if the best habitable areas (in terms of scenery, tran-
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quility, accessibility, etc.) are reserved for tourists,
then the tourists are undoubtedly the privileged ones.
The question of exclusiveness is important as a
topic of concern as many citizens of Jamaica and of many
other Caribbean resort countries have been complaining
about this problem. As a result their behaviour towards
the tourists is not as commendable as in years gone by.
The tourist industries in some of the Caribbean coun-
tries have been significantly affected economically because
of the attitudinal behaviour of the citizens. Lundberg
mentioned the cases of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
and the Bahamas in this respect. Jamaica is no exception.
In reviewing a number of the reports describing the
mistreatment of tourists, it appears that exclusiveness is
one of the principal causes for the mistreatment.2 One,
would be led by these reports to believe that there is a
direct link between mistreatment of tourists by hotel em-
ployees and exclusiveness.
Although the hotel employee is oftentimes justified
in the way (s)he feels, the tourist is not to be blamed in
every instance. However, exclusiveness sometimes result in
the prostitution of the residents of the resort area simply
for the sake of getting the tourist dollars.
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By no means should this prostitution be condoned. Even
though the tourist dollar is a very important fuel to the
Jamaican economy (as it has been shown in Chapter 1), the
economic benefits can be gained without the prostitution
of the hotel workers and other citizens simply because they
are not mutually exclusive.
Through exclusiveness some of the educational, socio-
logical, and economic values resulting from tourism become
undermined. For example, (1) the educational fruits of
tourism cannot be fully harvested because exclusiveness
hinders open communication between the tourists and the
local residents; (2) inhospitality and violence erupt be-
cause of the privileges which are granted to the tourists
but denied the local citizens; (3) the ensuing inhospital-
ity and violence threaten and negatively affect the tour-
ist industry because of the bad publicity given to the
country by disgruntled and victimized tourists. In the
following chapter a detailed description is given of the
deleterious effects of exclusiveness from educational, so-
ciological, and economic standpoints.
In this chapter, the aspiration is to show that the
typical tourist zones in Jamaica's resort areas are ex-
clusive. The average citizen is denied the right to enter
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these zones through covert or overt official policies which
may induce sociological, economic, or psychological deter-
rents. Whether these deterrents are derived from official
or unofficial policies or not, it does not matter. This
is not an issue here although the more official the policy
the more serious is the situation.
A macroscopic view will be taken in reporting the de-
gree of exclusiveness in resort areas. Thus, the physical
manifestations of exclusiveness will not be the only as-
pect to be discussed.
Resort areas are economically and socially exclusive,
and maintained so, through a variety of ways. These in-
clude:-
(a) High prices and price differentials
(b) Non-local constitution of tourist facilities
(c) Isolationist spatial patterns
PRICES
High prices are one of the instruments which make the
tourist zones in Jamaica's resort areas exclusive environ-
ments.
Considering the fact that Jamaica's tourist industry
developed from a wealthy clientele, the whole industry has
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been designed to cater exclusively to this class. Al-
though other less wealthy tourists and others of a more
average economic standing are visiting the country in
greater proportions, most of the tourists may still be
classified as wealthy. Table 1.5 gives the financial char-
acteristics of American tourists visiting Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, and the Nertherland Antilles. This sample
is offered her in lieu of one showing the financial char-
acteristics of tourists to Jamaica as this is momentarily
unavailable. However, there.is hardly any difference in
these characteristics for each of the Caribbean Islands as
North America generates most of their tourists.3
Having been designed to cater exclusively to a rich
clientele--, "...Jamaica gained some reputation as an ex-
clusive resort attracting mainly a wealthy and famous
clientele"--the financially average Jamaican becomes priced
out. As much as (s)he would like to, the meagre incomek
of the financially average Jamaican cannot allow the sat?
isfaction of spending a vacation at one of the hotels
without excessive economic sacrifice.
Hotels are much more expensive than the inns and
guest houses and, according to the most recent figures fur-
nished,5 the price of accommodation under the Modified
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American Plan at most inns range from J$45.00 to J$130400
in Montego Bay and in Kingston from J$49.00 to J$60.00 for
four days-three nights single occupancy.
If the prices for cottages are examined, then the same
exclusionary prices are evident. The following sample6
which represents the average cottages is offered:-
Montego Bay region
"Four bedrooms, four bathrooms, overlooking
golf course, maximum eight persons.
J$400. .per week".
"Three villas--each one air-conditioned bed-
rooms, one bathroom, on beach. Two adults,
two children. J$135 weekly".
Ocho Rios region
"Three bedrooms, three bathrooms, swimming
pool, magnificent views. Six persons.
J$200 per week".
"Four bedrooms, three bathroomslush tro-
pical garden and view. J$260. weekly".
These prices are seen in a brighter light when one re-
alizes what the incomes of Jamaicans are.
Choking under the grip of an unemployment rate which
has been fluctuating and was 17.2 per cent in October 1969,
23.2 per cent in April 2,972. and 22.5 per cent in October
1972,7 a lot of Jamaicans are living "from hand to mouth".
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In the urban areas the unemployment situation is even more
severe. The already ugly unemployment picture is even ug-
lier than what appears superficially as, on the average,
about one in every four employed men have been underemploy-
ed.8 In other words, about twenty-five per cent of those
men employed worked for four days or less per week.
A sample of the wages hotel employees received in 1970
is presented in Table 2.1.
A more comprehensive picture is given by Table 2.2.
This shows that the National Income per capita which was
J$370.5 in 1968 increased at an average of 9.7 per cent
per annum.9 The personal Income per capita and the Per-
sonal Consumption expenditure per capita increased over
the four-year period since 1968 at annual rates of 10.7
per cent respectively.10
Now from the evidence presented one can see how dif-
ficult it is for most Jamaicans to vacation atthe hotels.
In general, the accommodation rates are beyond the shallow
pockets of the average Jamaican.
High prices are not only evident in the accommodation
within inns and hotels but also within night clubs, res-
taurants, and shops.
WAGE RANGE SAMPLE FOR SOME
CATEGORIES OF WEEKLY PAID
HOTEL EMPLOYEES (1970)
EMPLOYEE CATEGORY
Room services
Housekeeper
Dining room
Bar
Kitchen
Maintenance
Security
Miscellaneous
WAGE RANGE (Js)
12.30-25.50
20.40-40.00
11.80-41.00
12.00-40.00
11.00-62.30
12.20-43.50
12.00-26.85
12.10-28.20
SOURCE: Jamaica Tourist Board, Our Tourist Industry, p.9
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TABLE 2.1:
39
TABLE 2.2: JAMAICA'S INCOMES PER CAPITA (J$ million)
National income p.c .
Personal income p.c.
Personal con-
sumption
expenditure p.c.
1968 1969
370.5 406.4
341.1 369.7
311.0 346.7
1970
449.6
421.6
384.1
1971
475.9
444.7
423.8
SOURCE: National Planning Agency, Economic Survey:
Jamaica 1972, Government of Jamaica (1972), p.134.
1972
514.5
486.5
462.4
YEAR
4o
In my many conversations with residents of Montego
Bay (i.e. middle-income and low-income), I learnt that most
of them feel that the tourist facilities there are without
doubt exclusionary. A general sentiment among the resid-
ents is that although they would like to experience what
the tourists revel in, they cannot because of the excessive
prices. For example, at the two best night clubs, the
price of a bottle of Coca-Cola--not to mention the admis-
sion charge which is exorbitant--is approximately five
times the average price within the area.
How can the average Jamaican go there? Besides, hav-
ing to pay a relatively exorbitant amount in order to be
admitted, the refreshments are priced outside of his econ-
omic range.
Aggravating this socio-economic situation and inten-
sifying the degree of exclusiveness is the increasing num-
ber of in-bond stores. In-bond stores are those which of-
fer duty-free shopping. In other words, no duties and no
purchase taxes are paid on the commodities purchased by
the shopper.11
The historic Charles Square which has been the com-
mercial focus of Montego Bay over the years abounds with
in-bonds stores. The same situation occurs around the
Sheraton, the Pegasus, and the Skyline hotels in New King-
ston. Almost all the hotels in Jamaica have in-bond
shops.
The fact that prices are reduced in the in-bond
stores because the buyer does not pay duties or sales
taxes seems contradictory to the argument of this paper
which says that high prices promote exclusiveness in the
resort areas. The truth comes out when it is told that
shoppers can only buy if they are leaving the country.
Once a purchase is made in an in-bond shop the commodity
can be retrieved only at the airport on the presentation
of an airline ticket. Thus, these consumer goods are only
available to those Jamaicans who travel a lot, namely the
"well-of f 1 .
Both the question of prices and that of to whom the
hotels, restaurants, stores and night-clubs cater are
closely interrelated as means of realizing exclusionary
tactics. Because of the exorbitant prices in those faci-
lities which are highly patronized by tourists, these faci-
lities do nothing else but cater to the appetities of
tourists and upper class Jamaicans and exclude the "have-
not" Jamaicans. The reverse is also true: having decided
to cater primarily to tourists will inevitably exclude the
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"have-not" Jamaicans as the high purchasing power of tour-
ists will inflate prices and the demands of the tourists
will definitely be for luxury goods.
CONSTITUTION OF TOURIST FACILITIES
Tourist facilities are so constituted that they cater
predominantly to the tourist to such an extent that almost
all the residents whom I have conversed with in Montego Bay
and Ocho Rios say that they, at some time or other, feel
ostracized and discriminated against.
As far as the restaurants are concerned, almost all of
them specialize in international cuisine which many Jamai-
cans dislike, rather than the local dishes. Many Jamaicans
have complained that they have found it quite embarrassing
and inappropriate when they are told that the local dishes
they order are unavailable. This persist most in the ho-
tels. Most times when they are appeased they have to suf-
fer the pain of waiting.
Hoteliers find that their hotels are more lucrative
when they are planned individually as a "total environ-
ment", and that is from the standpoint of tourists. The
aim of a "total environment" is to satisfy the primary
needs (i.e. sleeping and dining, recreating, and duty-free
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shopping) of the tourists. Although the needs of the Ja-
maican vacationing within this type of environment are gen-
erally the same as those of the tourists, satsifying the
needs of the tourist is satisfying those of the Jamaican.
Most hotels are not comprised of facilities which cater to
the needs of Jamaicans.
SPATIAL PATTERNS OF EXCLUSIVENESS
One tourist facility which is most popular to the
Jamaican is the beach. Yet, beaches are not really access-
ible to the average Jamaican. A recent Governmental sur-
vey12 reported that about seventy-four per cent of all the
beaches having facilities (e.g. changing rooms) on the
North Coast belong to the hotels, most of which require one
to book there in order to enjoy the beaches.13 The best
beaches in the island are occupied and controlled by the
hotels. In Montego Bay, the internationally famous Doc-
tor's Cave is open to all tourists registered at a hotel
in the area free of charge. Yet on the other hand, Jamai-
can residents find it quite difficult to gain admission.
Whenever they are admitted they always have to pay more
than a nominal sum.
It has been reported that there are 32,631 feet 14 of
beach frontage which the nation's hotels occupy while pub-
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lic bathing beaches and seaside parks constitute about
75,241 feet. 15 This means that there are approximately
1,820 feet of beach reserved for each one hundred hotel
beds while there are a minute 3.8 feet of beach available
for every one hundred citizens.16  This is an example of
how privileged the tourists are.
These calucations even make the situation better than
it really is as it is declared that "there are many (bea-
ches) which are in private ownership adjacent to beach cot-
tages, resort subdivisions of farmland".1 7 This may be
interpre-ted to mean that there is really more than 32,631' feet
beach frontage available to "private" individuals.
The recent wave of speculation also serves to aggra-
vate the problem as Brian Hudson mentioned that the beach
lands are being gobbled up by the upper classes, local and
absentee alike. 18
The fact that tourist facilities are physically iso-
lated from those facilities which are frequented by the
local residents adds to the degree of exclusiveness within
Jamaica's resort areas.
This physical 'isolation is blatantly visible, parti-
cularly in Montego Bay and the Ocho Rios area.
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Stretching from Oracabessa to Montego Bay one dis-
covers that the principle road along the North Coast acts
as a line of demarcation between tourist zones and the
local communities. These tourist zones are not really in-
viting to someone travelling along the road as these zones
(hotel compounds) seem to be designed against intruders.
They are oftentimes guarded silently by iron gates and in
some cases barbed wire fences or stone walls.
The main road is the most prominent line of demarca-
tion on approaching the hub of Ocho Rios rom the east. At
this point the traveller sees a startling juxtaposition.
On one side there is the sprawling luxury of the hotels
sitting in the poetic brillance of the tropical verdue
and, on the other,the naked truth of congestion and poverty
among the squatter vendors of handicrafts.
Instead of making these booths and the vendors a part
of the hotel areas, they are moved to positions Qutside of
the hotels' protective walls. There is no mixing between
tourists and the common folks, neither is there any recip-
rocity as the tourists can go in and out of the hotels'
gates while the common vendor feels that (s)he cannot go
in.
A prominent Jamaican architect described how hurt he
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felt at seeing a jerk pork vendor losing his large clien-
tele of tourists. This vendor used to sell his delicacy
just outside the hotel compound at a point where he was
easily visible and accessible from both within the hotel
compound and outside of it. However, for some reason or
the other, a wall was constructed resulting in his econo-
mic deprivation.
Other instances of economic deprivation have been seen
in the new development plans for both Montego Bay and Ocho
Rios. In these plans which will be implemented, a fishing
village has been eliminated in Montego Bay and two others
in Ocho Rios in order to accommodate exclusive tourist fa-
cilities. To make matters worse, none of these fishing
villages have been relocated but totally eliminated. The
tourists are a priveleged group indeed. Again, the poor
Jamaican is relegated to the bottom of the list of priori-
ties.
A map of Montego Bay, Figure 2.1 shows the physical
isolation of the tourist zone. There is no significant
degree of local activities of facilities heavily patronized
by locals within the tourist zones. Thus, the local resid-
ents will not be found in the tourist zones in great num-
bers (except as hotel employees) as there is hardly any-
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thing there which would attract them.
All tourist facilities are grouped together in highly
concentrated patterns. This is most evident in the case
of Montego Bay as manifested in Figure 2.1. In an area
which has so many hotels (as in the case of Montego Bay
and the Ocho Rios region) this concentration and large oc-
cupancy intensify the degree of exclusiveness as the ratio
of locally patronized facilities to tourist facilities is
decreased to the extent that the incidence of local acti-
vity in tourist zones becomes significantly minimal.
The best scenic spots in Jamaica's resort areas are
taken by hotels. Thus, the hotels have the best views and
easiest accessibility to the silvery sanded beaches. Be-
cause of their locations, the hotels on the North Coast
form a wall which makes visual access to the sea impossible
for people who are outside of the hotel compounds. The
reason why the hotels in Montego Bay do not display as
great a concentration on the beaches as in the Ocho Rios
region is due to the fact that there are fewer quality
beaches there. However, to make up for this hotels enjoy
the most scenic spots on the hills overlooking Gloucester
Avenue and the Queens Drive.
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CHAP. 3: REASONS FOR MINIMIZING EXCLUSIVENESS IN THE
RESORT AREAS
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Minimizing exclusiveness within a resort area is syn-
onymous with maximizing social interaction between the
tourist and the citizenry. The benefits of minimizing the
exclusiveness or maximizing the social interaction far out-
weigh the detriments.
In this chapter a discussion of the implication of
exclusiveness from economic, sociological and educational
standpoints will be given.
THE EDUCATIONAL STANDPOINT
Some tourists travel primarily to augment their know-
ledge, clarify some preconceptions they entertained, or to
be able to justifiably dispel some of the myths.which-be-
cloud their minds and obstruct their comprehension. On the
other hand, those tourists who incidentally constitute the
majority and who decide to take a trip for other reasons,
such as simply to relax, find that the educational gain,
although incidental, ineluctably occurs.
Tourists may learn more than a people by being immer-
sed in the cultural environment of that people. If one
wants to genuinely understand a people--their culture,
their behavioural attitudes, and other aspects of the
people--one can gain much more on a vis-a-vis basis
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than going to libraries and reading the relevant books or
staying in hotels. There is nothing quite like first hand,
vis-a-vis approach and this is where tourism can be bene-
ficial.
The educational effect of the recent detente developed
between the western world and the Communist bloc cannot be
denied. As Gray observed:-
"...The entry of communist countries
into the world travel market has had
the effect of reducing the ideological
and informational gaps between commun-
ist travel exporters and the western
world. The need to cater to tourists'
requirements has, in both -Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia, forced the travel exporters
to permit the influx of foreign cultural
and informational influences, for exam-
ple, magazines, movies and music. Any
trade with the western world by commun-
ist nations necessarily undermines iso-
lationism and it may be surmised that,
per dollar of export receipts, (sunlust)
tourism does more to destroy ideological
barriers than any other type of foreign
trade".1
Lundberg seem to have made similar discoveries in his
study.
He said in part that:-
"Travel exposures and experiences can
provide new standards, art forms, and
even new systems of belief. By view-
ing a range and diversity of societies,
the person- is likely to develop a
wider tolerance for cultures other than
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his own culture, perceptions are often
sharpened and the personal 'data bank'
enlarged".2
Though the statements cited here give the impression
that the educational values of tourism are reaped only by
the tourists, it must not be assumed that this is the case.
the hosts (that is, the citizens of the country which the
tourists are visiting) also reap some of the educational
benefits as they too simultaneously learn of the guests.
The reciprocity, in terms of the educational gains,
aids in nurturing the possibility of a fraternity of na-
tions. In these times when the dark clouds of the Cold
War seem to be thinning through detente and international
rapprochement,tourism is one of the most potent (if not
the most potent) catalysts in furthering international
understanding and world peace.
Establishing exclusive resort areas--resort areas in
which the links of communication between guests and hosts
are very limited--denies tourism of the educational qual-
ity. In this climate of exclusiveness the winds of
ignorance descend and blow away a valuable seed of inter-
national understanding and cultural respect.
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THE SOCIOLOGICAL STANDPOINT
The social ramifications resulting from the condona-
tion or promotion of exclusiveness in a resort development
can lead to very disastrous consequences.
Gray recommends that this is a negative aspect of tour-
ism development that "every government desirous of develop-
ing a travel export industry should face squarely".3 Con-
tinuing he said:-
"..,Because of wide differences in income
levels between the mass of local resi-
dents and the visiting foreigners, the
travel industry runs the risk of creat-
ing an enclave in which affluent for-
eigners are catered to and use resources
which are not available to the mass of
the domestic people". 4
Exclusiveness arises from creating an enclave of lux-
ury for tourists in a country in which poverty is rampant.
Jamaica may be classified as such a country. Such a dual-
istic environment "may exacerbate any feelings of resent-
ment toward foreigners which local people may already pos-
ess...The lack of courtesy and consideration of some tour-
ists toward their hosts is also likely to aggravate feel-
5ings of resentment".
When tourists revel under the cloak of exclusiveness,
the local residents, who do not have the freedom to share
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in the revelry for economic reasons or whatever, develop
an attitude of animosity towards their guests. As Lund-
berg noted:-
"...(the citizen) cannot afford to eat -in
the new restaurant ot buy at the boutique.
The native who receives a marginal income
can only observe; (s)he cannot participate.
His (or her) position vis-a-vis the tourist
accentuates his poverty and may lead to vio-
lence".6
Incidents of violence have been reported and there
seems to be an upsurge in the resentment that some local
residents hold for the tourists. The gaining of indepen-
dence 7 from Britain has resulted in the disappearance of
some of the cobwebs spun by colonialism which blinded the
vision of the colony's residents and mesmerized them into
servitude. With the repaired vision, Jamaicans could see
quite clearly the extent of exclusiveness which the tour-
ist industry condoned. This obviously contributed to the
upsurge of resentment during the 1960's. The Black Power
movement in the United States also constituted a contribu-
tion to clarifying the situation.
Nothing is unique about the reactions of the residents
towards the tourists. It is simply human proclivity to
harbour a disdainful feeling when they know that having
worked hard to promote themselves, their families, and
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their nation, they cannot enjoy the natural beauty of their
own country. Yet people (tourists) who have not conscious-
ly worked for the development ofthe country suffer no dif-
ficulty in enjoying the beauty spots of the country as they
please.
What is implicit in this situation is that tourists
are given special privileges or first preferences over the
citizens who by right are the heirs of this legacy.
A .similar situation becomes evident when a parent of-
fers a beautiful present to one of his or her children
without giving a gift to the other(s) after provoking the
desires of the latter. In this case jealousy results.
However, in the case of the tourists and the citizens a
different malady is aroused. This malady is termed frus-
tration. It occurs because the frustrated individual, in
this case the citizen, feels that (s)he has been deprived
of a right which (s)he has worked for with expectation.
The social process does not terminate when frustration
appears but runs its natural course until all the deleter-
ious consequences, such as violence, materialize. Ilfeld
states that "frustration and situational variables are most
visible as contributors to violence".
He further declares that frustration is born out of
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social discrimination, and political and economic impoten-
cy.9
Frustration is not a result of indolence. Frustrat-
ive levels seem to be attained according to Newton's Third
Law which states that for every action there is an equal
and opposite reaction. Therefore, the level of frustration
is higher for someone who has made a sacrificial input be-
cause (s)he is expecting a commensurable output. Frustra-
tion occurs whenever an individual's expectations are de-
nied or whenever there is an interference of his or her
"ongoing, goal-directed activity". 0 Consequently, the
higher the goal desired or the expectation, the greater
will be the degree of frustration if there is a denial of
that goal or expectation.
When the citizen works diligently to achieve social
mobility so as to be able to enjoy some of the trappings of
affluence and is unsuccessful, (s)he is led to violence
when (s)he realizes that the tourist is never seen labour-
ing yet is able to enjoy the trappings of affluence. While
this is not the fault of the tourists, this fact is still
evident.
Concomitant with the inducement of violence is the
intensification of class division, class rivalries and pro-
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bably racial animosity.
Class divisions and rivalries occur because the soc-
iety draws an indelible line of demarcation between the
"haves" and "have-nots"O. This line seems even more marked
in resort areas which are themselves pockets of luxury. As
if the legacy of colonialism is not steeped enough in
socio-economic prejudice, the exclusiveness of resort areas
further exacerbates the situation. Exclusiveness may be
equated with a denial of social rights to the majority of
the citizenry--the "have-nots".
Racial animosty is an issue because over ninety-five
per cent of Jamaica's population is black while most of the
tourist population is white. Therefore the tourists can be
easily identified as a group which appears to be responsi'
ble for denying the citizens of Jamaica the opportunity of
enjoying the beauty of their own country.
Over recent years there have been reports of overt ex-
pressions of animosity by the local citizenry towards the
tourists.11  The fact that this is not occurring only in
Jamaica but in other Caribbean resort countries in which
Gardens of Eden are created for the exclusive use of tour-
ists further supports the contention that exclusiveness is
the cause for the animosity. Incidents of disturbing pro-
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portions have been reported in Puerto Rico, the Bahamas,
the Virgin Islands, Bermuda, and Curacao, and it has al-
most always bee.n mentioned that these incidents evolved be-
cause the local residents in these various countries felt
that they were excluded from the pleasure of tourism
through beaches, hotels, and other tourist facilities.
THE ECONOMIC STANDPOINT
Hostility
Having already alluded to the sociological reasons
that show why condoning exclusiveness is a bad policy, the
author will attempt to show some of the detrimental econo-
mic effects which result because of the condoning of exclu-
siveness.
It was mentioned that resentment and sometimes vio-
lence become psychological off-springs of exclusiveness.
Violence, in the form of riots, have had some deleterious
effects on the economy.
In the 1961-63 period there was a well marked decline
in the number of tourists visiting Jamaica. One may at-
tribute this to a significant pull-out of British nationals
during this period, however there was no such pull-out.
This was a period of extreme violence and resentment and
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the marked decline may have been a result of this hostili-
ty.
In 1961, the year prior to the granting of its Inde-
pendence, Jamaica recorded a 1.1 per cent drop over the
previous year's tourist arrivals. 12 The over-all percent-
age drop with respect to 1960 for the two subsequent years
(1962 and 1963) was 9.7 per cent and 12.2 per cent respec-
tively.13
The other period of violence was 1967. In that year
statistics show that there was also a concomitant drop in
the number of tourists to Jamaica. There was a 3.8 per
cent decline under the preceding year's level.14 Refer to
Table 3.1 for an overview of the situation.
It should not be interpreted as the author's belief
that violence erupting from tourism was the only cause for
these declines in tourist arrivals. This, besides, is not
the real issue. What the author would like to be interpre-
ted as saying is that violence per se within the resort
areas has deleterious economic effects on the tourist in-
dustry.
Thus it would be senseless not to placate potentially
volatile situations as one such situation may trigger an-
other and cause a chain reaction to occur. Thus it would
TABLE 3.1 :
Year
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
ANNUAL TOURIST ARRIVALS (1957-1972)
Tourist Arrivals(thousands)
160.7
169.4
191.3
226.9
224.5
206.8
202.3
232.2
300.3
345.3
332.8
396.3
407.1
414.7
448.6
493.5
Source: (1 ) Jamaica Tourist Board,
Jamaica 1972, p. 4.
(2) Owen Jefferson, The Po
opment of Jamaica, Ins
Economic Research, Uni
Indies (1972), p. 174.
Travel Statistics:
st-War Economic Devel-
titute of Social and
versity of the West
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also be senseless not to minimize exclusiveness, a potenti-
ally volatile situation, within tourism.
Other Caribbean countries having a tourist industry of
great economic signifiance have shown evidence of how vio-
lence-contributing situations have had similar detrimental
economic effects. Trinidad and Tobago is a case in point.
Reference to Table 3.2 shows that in the case of both Jam-
aica and Trinidad and Tobago there was a decrease in their
share of the tourism pie between 1962 and 1963.
One reason for this may be due to the riots and threa
tening Black Power outcries that characterized Trinidad and
Tobago during that period. It seems more than mere coinci-
dence for these two countries to experience declines when
all of the other Caribbean countries recorded an increase.
One may not blame this decrease in the case of Trinidad and
Tobago to its being further from the United States. Such
an explanation would be groundless as three next-door
neighbours of Trinidad and Tobago, namely Barbados, Grenada
and St. Vincent, have reported growth rates in tourist ar-
rivals for the 1962-68 period of 17.3 per cent, 18.9 per
cent, and 23.0 per cent respectively.1 5 Jamaica and Trini-
dad and Tobago, on the other hand, evinced growth rates of
3.8 per cent and 4.6 per cent respectively. 1 6
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TABLE 3.2: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF TOURIST ARRIVALS
(expressed as percentages of total arrivals)
Windward Islands*
Leeward Islands**
Barbados
Northern Group***
Jamaica
Trinidad and Tobago
Bahamas
Total
1962
2.5
4.1
5.3
1 .2
24.9
8.4
53.6
100.0
1968
4.0
4.2
6.7
2.2
15.1
5.3
62.5
100.0
* These islands are St. Vincent,
and St. Lucia.
Grenada, Dominica,
** Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Antigua comprise
this group.
* This group is made up of the Turks and Caicos Islands,
the Cayman Islands, and the Virgin Islands.
Source: John M. Bryden, Tourism and Develo ment: A Case
Study of the Commoiwealth Caribbean Cambridge
University Press(1973), p. 101.
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When there are recurring incidents of violence there
is usually a subsequent decline in repeat visitors. The
immediate economic loss may seem obvious in this situation
but it:is even more intensified as such a situation means
that promoters of tourism have to increase their tourist
promotion budget. 17 When visitors return to their home
countries they often promote a resort area if they enjoyed
their vacation there. If not, they sometimes paint horrid
pictures which may dissuade any potential visitor.
Low Occupancy Rates
The exclusiveness of Jamaica's tourist facilities has
resulted in a lack of diversification in the types of ac-
commodation. Accommodative facilities are designed exclu-
sively for a wealthy clientele which the industry has his-
torically been built upon. 8 As a result of this, such fa-
cilities are expensively and elegantly furnished and there-
fore for them to be economically viable prices of accommo-
dation have to be high.
Seeing that Jamaica's wealthy clients visit mostly in
November-April when it is bitterly cold in their countries,
a seasonality develops which is characterized by low occup-
ancy rates of hotels during the remaining months except
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July and August. 19
Table 3.3 reflects the extent of hotel occupancy on a
national level.
Looking at the national picture, one would marvel at
the diseconomies introduced by low occupancy rates. For
example, during the 1965-72 period the tourist industry po-
tentially lost from J$20.3 million to J$112.8 million (See
Table 3.4). This means that Jamaica could have earned ap-
proximately J$220.7 million in 1972 which is more than
double its earnings for that year. This figure would be
even more economically significant as hotel operators would
get a higher proportionate profit when their hotels are
full or near full to capacity. In other words, hotel oper-
ators would benefit from the economies of scale which would
occur then when they are operating at a full or nearly full
occupancy.
Table 3.5 which exemplies the case of Antigua shows
that with rising occupancy rates the ratio of revenue to
cost increases from 1.4 at a 45.0 per cent occupancy to 1.6
at a 65.0 per cent occupancy. There is no constantly pro-
portionate increase between the total revenue and the total
expenses for the twenty per cent increase in the occupancy
rate as total expenses outpace total revenue.
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TABLE 3.3: OCCUPANCY OF HOTEL ROOMS (1965-1972)
Year Occupancy (%)
1965 69.6
1966 68.0
1967 65.0
1968 66.8
1969 62.1
1970 50.1
1971 51.5
1972 48.9
Source: Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics:
Jamaica 1972.
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TABLE 3.4: REAL AND PROJECTED TOURIST EXPENDITURES (1965-1972)
Tourist Expenditure
at Existing Occupancy
(J$million)
46.4
56.0
57.8
73.2
77.9
79*6
90.8
107.9
Tourist Expenditure
at Full Occupancy*
(J$million)
66.?
82.4
88.9
109.6
125.4
158.9
176.3
220.7
,lThese figures are the author's projections
Source: Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics: Jamaica 1972.
Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
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TABLE 3.5: STRUCTURE OF REVENUES AND COSTS AT DIFFERENT
OCCUPANCY LEVELS: A 100-room hotel project in Antigua.
Revenue and Costs (US$thousands) at
the following occupancy rates:
45% 65%
Revenue
Rooms 447.6 600.7
Food 234.6 333.0
Beverages 119.3 172.8
Laundry 4.2 6.0
Other 8.8 11.6
Total 814.5 1,124.1
Expenses
Cost of sales 130.9 176.7
Administration payroll 36.3 42.0
Other payroll 101.0 121.1
Administration and
other costs 43,9 50.8
Advertising 44.8 60.0
Heat, light, power 36.4 43.6
Repairs and maintenance 23.6 28.8
Other inputs 162.0 190.0
Total 578.9 713.0
Net income before
fixed charges 235.6 411.1
Source: John M. Bryden, Tourism and Development: A Case Study
of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Cambridge University
Press (1973), p. 126.
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From another angle, Bryden in his very exhaustive stu-
dy of tourism development in the Caribbean discovered that
capital gross output ratio decrease with increasing occup-
ancy rates. 20
The lack of diversification because of the obdurate
promotion of exclusiveness (where the tourist industry
caters primarily to a wealthy clientele) is one of the fac-
tors responsible for the low occupancy rates as the more
economically modest foreigners who wish to visit Jamaica
during the off-season discover that the hotel rates are too
high. Now with the decrease in cost of a summer vacation
in Europe, many Americans prefer to visit Europe. The high
rates of Jamaica's luxury hotels make any competition with
the European resort areas difficult.
Leakages
Another deleterious economic consequences of exclusi-
veness is "leakages".21
It has been shown in a previous paragraph that one as-
pect of exclusiveness results in the construction of high-
cost luxurious hotels. This means that the vast capital
outlays necessary for such construction limits the extent
of Jamaica ownership toithe rich. Thus, as one reads on to
the end of this chapter it will be apparent to the reader
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that there is an indirect link between leakages and exclu-
siveness.
Owen Jefferson in his study of the tourist industry22
found that leakages through remittance of profits to for-
eign investors in the industry was quite substantial. The
reason for this kind of leakage is due to the relatively
high percentage of hotels owned by foreigners. He reported
that in 1968 the breakdown of hotel ownership was as fol-
lows:-
Hotels locally owned 52.7%
Hotels foreign owned 30.7%
Hotels under mixed ownership 8.6%
100.0%0
Tlese figures, 2 3 Jefferson pointed out, although help-
ful in understanding the situation, are a bit misleading as
foreign ownership tends to be more pronounced among the
larger hotels. However, when ownership was examined in the
light of capacity in terms of the number of beds, it was
discovered that 55.6 per cent of the hotels were owned by
foreign citizens.24
The figures for guest houses, apartments and villas
are unavailable and thus a better overview of the situation
cannot be given. However, this did not stop Jefferson from
stating that "foreign ownership of capital in the indus-
try--including other facilities such as car rental agen->-a
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cies-- is substantial".25
The results of these findings indicate that some of
these leaking channels could be plugged if there was a
greater incidence of local ownership. Though it is imprac-
tical to reduce the import propensity to zero, at least a
higher proportion of salaries and profits could remain
within the country if there was total ownership by citi-
zens.
The question of local ownership needs further examina-
tion as the present situation suggests that enhancing local
ownership is not enough although it is indeed a beginning.
Because of the fact that local hotel owners are rich
by Jamaican standards, the profits derived from the opera-
tion of the hotels accrue to the "well-off" class. Such an
occurrence furthers the cause of economic disparity--it
drives a bigger economic wedge between the "haves" and the
"have-nots".
Having the profits accruing to the rich Jamaican hotel
owners is almost synonymous to that of having the profits
accruing to foreigners. The reason being is that it is
said that it is now the common practice for rich Jamaicans
to open bank accounts in foreign countries in order to
evade some taxation.26 When this happens it is the same as
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increasing the import propensity through leakages. Fur-
thermore, the final effect of this picture stifles the
beneficial multiplier effects resulting from the receipt of
the tourist dollar.
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CHAP. 4: A CONTEMPORARY PLAN FOR A RESORT CITY
(MONTEGO BAY) AND THE EVIDENCE INHERENT OF
EXCLUSIVENESS
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Evidences of exclusiveness have been mentioned in
Chapter 2. Although the resort areas in Jamaica began
decades ago there seems to be no change in the attitudes
of planners with respect to resort development. Contem-
porary plans still expose factors which generate exclu-
siveness. The plan for Ocho Rios done by a reputable
firm, the Shankland Cox Partnership, is one example of
a contemporaby plan which induces exclusiveness; so does
the plan for Montego Bay done by the same firm. Because
of the almost identical treatment for both towns, only
one of these plans will be examined. It till be that for
Montego Bay. However, before focussing on the prescribed
plan for Montego Bay and its attendant exclusiveness, it
is necessary for an introduction to the area, namely
Montego Bay, be given in order to see the plan in its
proper perspective.
MONTEGO BAY AND THE INCIDENCE OF TOURISM
Montego Bay is the second largest city in Jamaica
and the largest on the north coast. With a present popu-
lation Of Over 42,000 people, it manifested an annual
growth rate of approximately 6.1 per cent between 1960
and 1970 when censuses were taken. 1 This population
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growth rate made it the third fastest growing urban area
in the island.2
Considering its location by the sea, Montego Bay is
a city with varied and dramatic topography. Its undulating
hills slope gently down to kiss the blue-green Caribbean
Sea in most areas, although most of this urban centre is
below five hundred feet3 above sea level. The western
flange of the city is given additional visual relief by
the expansive plantations of sugar cane.
Accessibility
Montego Bay, although about one hundred and twenty
miles from the country's capital, Kingston, is easily
accessible from other towns as all are inter-connected
by asphalted roads. Besides, there is a public railroad
which runs twice daily along the length of the country
linking strategic points between Kingston and Montego Bay
(see Figure 1.1). Buses are another source for public
transit which offer much more flexibility for the passen-
gers than automobiles. For the well-off businessman in a
hurry, there are international jetliners at his disposal
linking Montego Bay and Kingston and also small aircrafts
which service (besides Montego Bay and Kingston) Mandeville,
a centrally located urban centre, and Port Antonio and Ocho
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Rios on the north coast.
Climate
Montego Bay is blessed with a salubrious climate which
is an asset to its tourist industry. There are no threat-
ening seasonal changes in the temperature but the highest
temperatures occur between June and September when the
mean maximum is over 90*F and the mean minimum between
October and May when the temperature varies between seventy
4
and seventy-five degrees fahrenheit. The alternation of
land and sea breezes which occur daily add to the salubrity
of the climate. As far as fainfall is concerned, Montego
Bay does not get an excessive amount. Rainfall is at its
highest levels in May and October. In those months it
hovers around seven inches per month.5 The relative humi-
dity is fairly high at an annual range of 71* to 770* 6
The daily variation is usually about ten to twenty per cent
higher in the morning.7
Popularity Rise
Montego Bay's harbour was the nucleus for its urban
growth as this harbour was the principal northern port for
the dispatch of exports comprising of mainly agricultural
commodities. Although being second only to Kingston in
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terms of population, Montego Bay is the mecca of Jamaica's
tourism. It had not enjoyed this stature at the inception
of the tourist industry but with the decline of Port Antonio
as a town, Montego Bay displaced it at the top of the resort
ladder. One reason for Montego Bay's comparatively rapid
growth as a resort centre may be attributed to the fact
that it is the gateway to the island for most tourists and
it is strategically located with respect to the island's
best beaches and other resort facilities particularly on
the North Coast.
Between 1965 and 1972, the annual number of "longstay"
tourists8 has shown a steady rise. In 1965 the total was
132,777 and seven years later it was at 263,305.9 This
represents an average annual growth rate of about 10.5 per
cent which when compared with the growth rate of resident
population seems remarkable.10 Similar growth rates are
also evident in "short-stay" tourists and "stop-overs".
A specification of the figures is represented in Table 4.1.
The comprehensive growth rate for total tourist influx into
Montego Bay is 16.0 per cent.12
Tourist Accommodation
Hotel accommodation has shown a corresponding growth.
TABLE 4.1: TOURISTS BY
MONTEGO BAY
AIR AND SEA (1965-'72)
Short-stay
Air Se
6,895 -
6,920 -
7,151 -
8,743 
-
9,092 -
2,639 
-
5,924 -
6,220 -
Source: Jamaica Tourist Board,
Jamaica 1972, p. 12.
Travel Statistics,
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Air Sea
Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
Air
132,777
137,706
142,402
153,275
168,798
184,221
194,766
263,305
Sea
1
1
1
119,672
144,626
149,553
162,018
177,890
196,860
210,690
279,525
a
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Although there have been declines in certain categories of
accommodation, the comprehensive picture portrays one of a
steady annual growth. Between 1968 and 1972 there has been
13
an increase of 1,377 rooms in terms of tourist accommo-
dation which represents an annual growth rate of approxi.-
mately 21.1 per cent. At the end of 1971 Montego Bay had
14
an accommodation of 3,572 tourist rooms.
Table 4.2 reflects the average capacity of hotels in
Montego Bay and the percentage occupancy between 1968 and
1972. One of the facts which emanate from this presentation
is that while capacity has increased annually a downward
trend is occuring in terms of the percentage of rooms or
beds which have been occupied. It should be noted that
this does not mean that the total number df tourists arri-
ving in Montego Bay has been declining. What really has
been happening is that tourist accommodation has been
outgrowing the number of tourist arrivals during the 1968-
'72 period.
Employment Through Tourism
It is very difficult to accurately estimate how many
workers a tourist industry employs because of second and
other subsequent generation of employment resulting from
the multiplier effects of tourists' expenditures. However,
the Tourist Board reported that in 1971 and 1972 there were
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TABLE 4.2: AVERAGE CAPACITY, CAPACITY SOLD, AND PERCENTAGE
OCCUPANCY OF MONTEGO BAY'S HOTELS (1968-'72)
Year
Ave. Capacity
Rooms
Beds
Nights Sold
Rooms
Beds
Ave. House Count
% Occupancy
eoms
Beds
1968
1 ,429
2,841
349,436
661 ,778
1818.1
67.2
64.0
1L62
1,626
3,230
361,430
684,345
1844.6
59.9
57.1
1970
2,139
4,285
1971
2,512
5,018
393,320 483,758
751,940 925,520
2060.1 2535.7
50.4
48.1
52.8
50.5
1 972
2,883
5,762
536,057
1,036,971
2833.2
50.8
49*2
Travel Statistics., Jaaica 1972,Source: Jamaica Tourist Board,
p. 20.
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4,520 and 4,,545 persons respectively employed directly by
the tourist industry in Montego Bay.15 These figures
suggest an employee/'hotel" room ratio of between 8:5 and
.169:5. It has been reported, also, that the present trend
in this industry shows that for every direct or "internal"
employee there are 1.5 indirect or "external" employee on
the average. Therefore, for the years previously cited,
namely 1971 and 1972, the total employment generated in
Montego Bay was about 6,780 and 6,817 persons respectively.
Future Projections
A team of experts from the United Nations made projec-
tions concerning the growth of tourism on a national level
in Jamaica. The projection at the time of its announcement
covered a period of twenty years (1970-1990) into the future.
It is my view that any such projection has to be considered
dubious especially when one realizes the instability of a
tourist industry, especially one of the nature of Jamaica's
which is characteristically mono-cultural. The unforeseen
energy crisis caused by the rallying of the Arab oil pro-
ducers under the banner of OPEC18 and their subsequent oil
embargo has resulted indirectly in a lessening of the pre-
dicted tourist tidal wave in Jamaica as fewer Americans
are willing to accppt the inflated cost of foreign travel.
In the twenty-year projection, the figures stated
for Montego Bay are unrealistic as an increase of 3,900
rooms is predicted.19 This means that over this period
there would be an increase of about 92.4 per cent in
tourist accommodation. In the proposal (which will be
later delineated) there are approximately 1,700 rooms sug--
gested in an already high-density development.
Montego Bay does not have an abundance of virgin
coastal land or other types of land suitable for resort
development. If there is going to be an expandive increase
in resort development, then it will take place principally
in the Negril area. Negril is west of Montego Bay and is
blessed with some of the most beautiful beaches in Jamaica
which are so far untouhed by resort development. (See
Figure 1.1). At the present time there is only one small
hotel there.
The only way in which Montego Bay can physically
support an additional 3,300 rooms for tourists is if more
land is reclaimed from the sea, However, such a modus
operandi could only be economically feasible through a
high-density proposal as the cost of reclamation is quite
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high. A high-density development would impose a social
pressure of such magnitude that the present infrastructure
(or any moditication of it) would result in total chaos.
The traffic in the city is already a congested problem.
TRE PLA1
The target area f or which the contemporary plan was
developed represents a high percentage of land reclaimed
from tha Caribbean Sea. This area is now an appendage to
the existing resort area of Montego Bay as it stretches
from the famed Doctor's Cave Beach Club on its northermost
tip to the historical centre of Montego Bay in the south.
In all, this target area is comprised of approximately
sixty-four acres.
The following map, Figure 4 .1, gives some idea of the
location of the target area within the urban framework of
Montego Bay.
In expanding the Montego Bay resort area, the Jamaican
government commissioned the services of the Shankland Cox
Partnership, to make studies and finally prescribe a plan
for the development of the city's waterfront. Figure 4.la
represent's the plan which this firm developed.
TARGET AREAFIG. 4.1
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On the sixty-four acres of reclaimed land, the Shank-
land Cox Partnership proposed a mixture of tourist facili-
ties. They improved on the traditional recipe for a resort
area by including offices, apartments, and a park among
the traditional ingredients of hotels and shops. The
proposal embodies a total of:-
- 95,000 square feet of shopping
- 19,600 square feet of space devoted to
bars, restaurants, and clubs
- 77,800 square feet of office space
- 13 studio apartments
- 34 two-bedroom beach houses
- a two-acre park
- 1,619 hotel rooms
Heights of buildings go from a single storey to twelve
stories, As a matter of fact, five of the six proposed
hotels are no lower than ten stories.
An examination of Figure 4.2 shows that the Shank-
land Cox Partnership proposed the division of the target
area into four portions thus somewhat isolating some of
the functions. One portion comprises Lots #1-7 inclu-
sively, another Lots #8-14, the third of only Lot #15, and
the last of Lot #16, The first eight lots (Lots #1-7)
are to be totally designed as tourists' residences. Lots
#8-14 which collectively are called the St. James Centre
describe the recreational and commercial sector of the
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plan. The last two lots, namely Lot #15 and Lot #16, are
devoted respectively to shops and a park. Reference to
Table 4.3 will give a summary of the facilities pres-
cribed by the firm,
The following excerpt from the Shankland Cox Partner-
ship report which was prepared for the Govermental agency
in charge of the execution of this proposal, the Urban
Development Corporation, will give some intimate insights
into the proposed environment:-
Resort Area
This sector comprises the three new beach
area of Close Harbour, Fortress and Gun
Point Beaches. Close Harbour Beach is
the major hotel zone containing four new
hotels. The hotels face directly on to
the beach the depth of which would be up
to one hundred feet. Each hotel will
have individual landing facilities for
small craft.
The access into the area is from the town
boulevard. Fortress and Gun Point beaches
consist of apartments and beach houses.
The buildings will be kept low with their
roof lines below Gloucester Avenue si that
the existing view of the harbour from the
Queens Drive slopes will not be spoiled,
St. James Centre
The reclaimed land immediately west of the
existing town centre is to be developed as
a commercial, shopping, and entertainment
centre. There will be ample restaurant
and refreshment facilities overlooking
SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENT - Table 4.3
Lot Area in
number acres
Sq.ft. of Number Beds
space of beds acre
per Parking Number
spaces of storeys
Hotel - 310 rooms
34 - 2 bedroom Beach houses
60 - 2 bedroom Apartments
Hotel - 300 rooms
Hotel - 180 rooms
Hotel - 277 rooms
Hotel - 472 rooms
Shops
Park
ST. JAMES CENTRE (LOTS 8 -14)
3.5 Public beach club
2.08 Offices
2.5 Shops
Offices
9 - 2 bedroom apartments
2.45 Shops
2.14 Hotel - 80 rooms
4.82 Shops
20 - 2 bedroom & 4 studio apts.
Clubs, bars & restaurant
Crafts market
3.7 Offices
29 - 2 bedroom & 9 studio apts.
Restaurant and clubs
shopping space including crafts market
bars, restaurants and clubs
office space
apartment beds
54,200
28,000
6,400
33,400
14,400
15,400
20,000
17,200
4,200
95,800
19,600
77,800
36
160
84
125
55
90
)120)
)
110
80 40
56
24
20
66
46
20
245
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
15
16
4.12
5.5
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.7
6.3
0.5
2.0
620
136
240
600
360
554
944
150
25
80
200
120
150
150
150
68
60
150
90
150
236
10 - 12
2 -3
2 -4
10 - 12
10 - 12
10 - 12
10 - 12
1- 2
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Total
Total
Total
Total
1 -3
1 -2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
2
3
2
3
2
00
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the harbour and also certain cultural uses
such as a Jamaican arts and craft centre.
The centre will be developed as a series -
of landscaped pedestrian plazas and malls,
each one with a different atmosphere and
character.
The principal pedestrian mall links the
new waterfront, through to Charles Square,
in the old town. Good vehicular and pedes-
trian links between the centre and the
old town are an important design objec-
tive,
Pedestrian ways across the north gully
will be provided by foot bridges connecting
the entertainment and shopping plazas and
the large public beach.20
EVIDENCE OF EXCLUSIVENESS IN THE SCP PLAN
It has already been shown that exclusiveness exists
within Jamaica's principal resort areas, Now, there does
not seem to be any ameliorative proposal afoot in this re-
port, For example, the plan21 created by the $hankland
Cox Partnership (SCP) for the further development of
Montego Bay as a resort area makes very little effort to
minimize exclusiveness. There are aspects of the SCP
plan which will result in Montego Bay continuing along the
path of exclusiveness. The following are some of the more
prominent evidences.
Evidence 4.1: The tourist, once (s)he is within a
90
hotel is not induced enough to get outside of his (or her)
immediate environment and mingle with the local people.
In the absence of commercial facilities23 which would
encourage a high level of human interaction and aid in
bringing tourists out ot their hotels, landscaped pedes-
trian walkways could be a tool for inviting tourists to
areas outside of their immediate environment and directing
them to areas of interest to the tourist. The landscaped
promenades, as depicted in Figure 4.3, do not continue into
the hotel area but stop just outside of the hotel whidh is
closest to the hub of the town. Thus, there are 2,510
hotel beds which are deprived of being linked to the acti-
vity centre of the town. This number represents an as-
tounding 96.9 per cent. In other words 96.9 per cent of
tourists are deprived of this linking tool--deprived of
strolling into town along landscaped. paths.
Furthermore, because of the absence of integration
between the proposed landscaped promenades and the hotels,
the majority of the tourists will ineluctably decide to
take a taxi-cab into town. This procedure exacerbates the
situation as the tourist is relatively isolated from a
wider spectrum of the local citizenry until (s)he gets to
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his (or her) destination.
Evidence 4.2: Most of the hotels are planning to
have private beaches which therefore will not be freely
open to the general public. To be more specific, 89.5
per cent of total tourist accommodation will enjoy the
luxury of private beaches. The strip of private beaches
in contrast to the lone public beach open to non-tourists
in Figure 4.4 emphasises the disproportionality.
This planning strategy serves to intensify trie degree
of exclusiveness as notels- become more self-supporting
and independent. Tiie incidence of local retidents is
reduced to such an extent that there almost may be no
social interaction between tourists and the resident po-
pulace.
Evidence 4.3: The allocation of almost all of the
coast to private use in accordance with the SCP plan re-
presents an afffont to the resident populace as the coast
line is freely accessible to all.
Such an allocation will certainly cause the local
citizen to despise the tourist in ways presented in Chap-
ter 3.
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The fact that tourists are treated as a privileged
group (according to the SCP plan) in contradistinction
to the residents is in itself evidence of exclusiveness.
Evidence 4.4: The new proposal will deny the residents
the scenic views they presently enjoy from Gloucester
Avenue and Fort Street. (Refer to Figure 2.1). No longer
will they be able to walk or drive along these streets
and see the white-crested waves racing into land or the
illumination of the sea by the sun or the moon.
All these deprivations will ensue if the SCP pro-
posal is adopted since the beaches will become relatively
inaccessible to the residents and most of the hotels will
go beypnd ten stories.
Evidence 4.5: There are indications that the hotels
are not planned with the common folks in mind. There are
no innovative planning strategies employed which will
serve to invite the average citizen to utilize their
facilities.
The hotels are planned with only the foreign tourist
in mind.
Evidence 4.6: All the hotels are planned in such
95
ways that they, to some indubious extent, will be archi-
tecturally alien to their environment.
There will be no respect for architectural scale,
Hotels will be built along the beach in a way reminiscent
of the towers of Miami Beach stretching up competitiely
to the sky. It seems as if the planners showed no sym-
pathy for the backdrop of beautifully rolling hills
because the hotels are planned as if these hills were non-
existent.
In their plans for the Kingston waterfront and Ocho
Rios, the Shankland Cox Partnership made the same propo-
sal--a wall of high-rise buildings along the coast--even
though these areas are flat in topography.
There is no other structure which is ten to twelve
stories high within the heart of the town.
Evidence 4.7: There is no diversity in hotel types
intermingled together to promote social interaction be-
tween tourists and the residents, and between all socio-
economic levels.
Evidence 4.8: The hotels planned are not inter-
mingled with active local facilities (i.e., facilities
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which generate a high level of communal participation).
As a matter of fact, the hotels are divorced from these
facilities.
Evidence 4.9: Because of the fact that most of these
hotels are not within a comfortable walking distance of
local amenities and Charles Square, the hub of Montego
Bay, the tourist will probably take a taxi-cab--an isola-
tion-producing transportational mode--when (s)he wants to
go into town,
Evidence 4.10: Exclusiveness is further encouraged
by the total absence of community spaces within the hotel
environment (i.e., within those areas between hotels and
other tourist facilities) where residents may, for example,
sit, chat and play dominoes,
Evidence 4.11: No substantive strategy has been em-
ployed to mitigate vehicular congestion to a level where
social interaction may be maximized.
Vehicular congestion is a problem at present and it
will be a greater problem with the construction of hotels
with more than 3,850 tourist beds.
Evidence 4.12: An SCP report proudly declares that
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"each hotel will have individual landing facilities for
small craft". This strategy, without doubt, will serve
to intensify the degree of exclusiveness as tourists will
not have to come into contact with local residents on his
way to the hotel after departing from the airport. These
aircrafts will certainly not be serving the local residents.
Evidence 4.13: No effort has been made to promote
local facilities which are already present through increa-
sed tourist participation or increased tourist incidence
within local ared.
Although there is some amount of integration between
the proposed St. James Centre--the commercial portion of
the proposal--there is no significant integration, if any,
between the hotel zone and the existing facilities of
Charles Square, St. James Street, and other prominent
commercial areas.
The Jamaica Railway Corporation terminus represents
one example of a local facility which has great potential
for development which is beneficial to both tourists and
residents alike, yet this facility is left untouched by
the SCP proposal.
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Evidence 4.14: There is no significant integration of
the tourist zone en masse with the existing community. The
interphase between the tourist zone and the community is
starkly defined.
A plan which no powerfully draws a thick line of demar-
cation between the tourist zone and the rest of a community,
to some extent, implies a certain degree of isolation be-
tween the tourists and the local residents which could be
sociologically detrimental to both groups in such ways as
those mentiondd previously in Chapter 3.
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CHAP. 5: PHYSICAL PIANNING OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES FOR
MINIMIZING EXCLUSIVENESS IN NEW RESORT AREAS
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INTRODUCTION
The strategies which will be unveiled in this chapter
must not be interpreted as a sweeping panacea for elimi-
nating exclusiveness within resort areas. These strate-
gies are limited since they aim at only ways to minimize
exclusiveness through physical planning. Other aspects
of exclusiveness may be reduced through economic policies.
However, only through a combination of both physical
planning and economic planning can there be any hope for
anything close to a total reduction of exclusiveness.
The strategies described in this chapter are offered
as guidelines for the planning and design of Jamaica's
resort areas, particularly the target area described in
Chapter 4 so that the designed environment becomes a more
satisfying resort area to both residents and tourists
alike.
While same of the strategies may seem almost unattain-
able with present-day technology, there is no reason why
they should not be listed. Through constant reflection
on the part of architects and planners, it is conceivable
that these strategies may bear fruits in the future. On
the other hand, just getting those architects and planners
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and the other professionals who are involved in resort
development to think along the lines implied by the strate-
gies with relentless determination to develop methods for
realizing the relevant objectives is in itself constructive
in the pursuit of minimizing exclusiveness.
It must be realized that these strategies do not serve
to rebuild those structures which already exist and are in
defiance of the strategies but to serve those structures
which have yet to be built. These strategies are developed
primarily for those resort areas where there is enough
virgin land available through urban renewal or land recla-
mation for an impression to be made in terms of minimizing
exclusiveness.
DEFINITIONS
In order to aid in understanding the strategies pre-
sented in this chapter, it is necessary that some of the
terms be clearly defined. The terms which may be ambiguous
are:-
(a) hotel
(b) tourilt facility
(c) community facility
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Hotel group: A "hotel group" is a group of such
facilities as hotels and tourist facilities. The group
may be comprised of only hotels providing for the two
basic needs of sleeping and eating and spatially arranged
so as to effect intense interaction between the different
components.
Cultural gropp: A "cultural group" is comprised of
facilities which serve as vehicles for cultural expression.
Examples of these facilities are:- theatres, dance workshops,
various art workshops, and museums. These facilities are
spatially arranged to effect intense interaction between
themselves.
Community group: This kind of group is formed by
community facilities. Some of the components of a cultural
group may also be included in a community group. Tourist
facilities are not debarred from this group so long as the
group in toto is patronized overwhelmingly by the residents
rather than the tourists.
Resort group: A "resort group" describes the combi-
nation of a hotel group(s), cultural group(s), and commu-
nity group(s) which in toto is self-supporting as the
groups complement each other.
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THE OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES: THE HOTEL
Objective I: A hotel should be designed to be com-
fortable yet it should induce its guests to participate
in activities outside of its grounds.
Reason I: Any hotel which satisfies its guests'
needs totally on site may lead to a promotion of exclu-
siveness rather than a minimization of it. Some tourists
may prefer under the circumstances to remain within the
hotel instead of going outside its boundaries and be intro-
duced to a different culture.
Strategy I-1: No hotel must be designed with facili-
ties which satisfy all the basic needs1 of the tourists.
Strategy I-2: The hotel which is isolated and con-
structed away from the town's principal commercial dis-
tricts (i.e. outside of a one hundred-yard radius of these
commercial districts) should be equipped with a dining
facility. 3 However, if it is located within one hundred
yards of any of the town's primary commercial districts,
it should not have a dining facility (assuming there are
adequate dining facilities in the town). 4
Strategy I-3: The hotel which is located within any
1o4
of the town's foremost commercial districts whould not
provide in-bond shopping.
Objective II: No hotel should cause anyone to be
excluded from enjoying scenic spots of psychological and
historical significance and cherished natural environmen-
tal elements.
Reason II: The natural and irreplaceable elements
of a country should not be isolated from its citizens.
Neither should these elements be isolated from tourists as
God created natural elements for all to enjoy. Sites made
significant by historical events are almost in the same
category.
If the scenic and historical spots are not made pub-
lic then some segment of the populace will definitely be
excluded from spiritually experiencing these spots.
Strategy II-1: All beaches must be public in terms
of ownership and usage.
Strategy 11-2: The boundary of any private hotel
land must be located at least one hundred and fifty feet
from the high tide level of any beach.
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Strategy 11-3: No hotel should be located where it
would block such views which have been cherished by a
significant proportion of the populace.
Strategy II-4: In cases where a hotel can enhance
the view it may be so located (but without opposing
Strategy 11-2) providing the management makes the view
accessible to the general public by allowing free sight-
seeing.
Strategy 11-5: No hotel should be located on his-
torical sites unless it is going to make sight-seeing free
to all.
Strategy II-6: Any hotel built on a historical site
must be designed to be sympathetic to the site and his-
torical elements which may be on the site. Such a faci-
lity must not be designed as if the historical elements
were absent.
Strategy 11-7: Important historical elements (such
as churches, forts, etc., which have been recommended by
the Historical Society and the National Trust as signifi-.
cant historical elements) should not be demolished or
removed in order to accommodate a hotel.
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Objective III: A hotel in a congested area5 must not
increase on-street congestion (to levels which are harmful
to human interaction) or must provide relief to motorists.
Reason III: Vehicular traffic if not controlled may
produce severe congestion which reduces social interaction
between people. People become more aware of the motor
vehicles rather than the people around them and seek to
avoid them.
Strategy III-1: Convention hotels should provide
parking spaces in the ratio of 3:4 (i.e., three spaces for
every four hotel rooms) within its property. A motel
should have 1:1 ratio, and other types should have at
least a 1:2 ratio.
THE OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES: THE HOTEL GROUP
Objective IV: Social interaction between tourists
and the local citizenry, and between people of all
socio-economic levels should be promoted.
Reason IV: Without social interaction between tour-
ists and the local citizenry, and people of all socio-
economic levels, the attengts to minimize exclusiveness
will be futile. Such social interaction is necessary if
107
the barriers of exclusiveness are to be significantly
lowered.
Strategy IV-1: Hotels of different types should be
grouped together so as to be complementary to each other
in terms of services--satisfying all the basic demands of
the tourists. (Slee Planning Diagram.)
Strategy IV-2: Include among hotels such facilities
as locally-operated restaurants and small retail shops.
(See Planning Diagram.)
Strategy IV,63: Two hotels which together supply all
the basic needs of the tourists should not be placed adja-
cent to each other as paths of communication may become
short-circuited. (Refer to Planning Diagram.)
Strategy IV-4: There must be ample space (as part
of the hotel group) for communal and public use which
should be central and the hub which integrates the com-
ponents of the group. (See Planning Diagram.).
Strategy IV-5: The communal spaces must be for all
to use and should not be left-over spaces but designed to
be active with the possibility for people to use them at
nights.
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Strategy IV-6: Vehicular traffic must be limited
within the hotel group. (Refer to Planning Diagram.)
Strategy IV-7: The principal mode of vehicular
transportation within the hotel group area must be mini-
buses. Private cars and taxi-cabs rate low as vehicles
which promote social interaction in the Jamaican society.
Objective V: The hotel group must be a cohesive and
viable entity.
Reason V: There is definitely no sense in promoting
strategies for planning and designing resort areas if those
strategies will serve to erode the viability of the project.
If in one's avid pursuit of minimizing exclusiveness via-
bility is not achieved, then one's efforts will be all
for nought as exclusiveness cannot be attained in a dead
project.
The planner should not sacrifice the opportunity of
attracting tourists and making them comfortable in his or
her stubborn pursuit of minimizing exclusiveness when
both goals can be accomplished simultaneously.
Since it is advocated in this thesis that hotels
should be incomplete, then completeness which is necessary
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to viability must be attained in some other way. There-
fore, the incompleteness of the individual hotel must be
transformed into completeness by the grouping of hotels
to form the hotel group.
Strategy V-1: Other tourist facilities which may be
necessary in making the hotel group complete may be in-
cluded within the group. Bars, restaurants, and night
clubs are some examples of these facilities.
Strategy V-2: A hotel group must be in juxtaposition
with local facilities and there must be strong links of
dependency. (See Planning Diagram.).
Strategy V-3: Covered walkways between the components
of the hotel group (assuming there are other facilities
besides touristst) must be incorporated so as to ensure
against operational breakdown through climatic adversities.
(See Planning Diagram.)
Strategy V-4: There must be inter-linking covered
walk-ways between the hotel group and the adjacent local
facilities. (See Planning Diagram.)
Strategy V-5: Environmental quality must be amelio-
rated through good landscaping which must emphasize the
I15
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tropical environment. Ldly ponds for ducks and tropical
"feeding trees" for birds should be part of the environ-
ment. Hotel grounds must be in themselves a mini-park.
THE OBJECTIVE AND STRATEGIES: THE CULTURAL GROUP
Objective VI: Informally teach what the Jamaican
culture is all about.
Reason VI: It is felt that understanding a culture,
whether through exposure to it or whatever, will lead to
a greater understanding of and respect for those people
of that culture. This subsequently will open the lines of
communication between tourists and the citizens.
Communication between the citizens and the tourists
is a necessary step in breaking down the barriers of
exclusiveness.
Strategy VI-1: Facilities which are local vehicles
for cultural expression (such as art studios, theatres,
museums, etc.) may be included as components of the hotel
group.
Strategy VI-2: Cultural facilities may be linked
together to form a cultural group and located within
119
one hundred yards of hotels.
Strategy VI-3: Each cultural group must have a
central open-air court--the hub of the group which should
be designed as a flexible space for theatrical performance
or any other form of cultural exposition. (Refer to
Planning Diagram.)
Strategy VI-4: The cultural group(s) must be easily
accessible to all. (See Planning Diagram.).
THE OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES: THE RESORT GROUP
Objective VII: There must be a strong relationship
between the hotel group(s) and the cultural group(s).
Reason VII: A strong relationship between the hotel
group(s) and the cultural group(s) is necessary if the
resort group is to be (as is intended) the foremost ex-
pression of minimal exclusiveness.
Strong links are the arteries which vitalize and
nourish the resort group--the epitome of minimal exclusive-
ness.
Strategy VII-1: Those strong links must be public-
oriented with strong community (residents of all socio-
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economic levels) participation.
The links may be constituted by small retail shops
and boutiques owned and operated by the local resident
and providing the consumer goods for the needs and tastes
of the citizen. (S)ee Planning Diagram.)
Strategy VII-2: The shops and boutiques must be
spatially dispersed so that no shop or boutique selling
primarily the same goods are placed adjacent to each
other.
Strategy VII-3: Seats should be provided away from
traffic where pedestrians may sit and communicate, and
enjoy an overview of the scene.
Strategy VII-4: The links should provide protection
from the elements. Hence, in the case of shops and bou-
tiques, overhangs would be appropriate.
Strategy VII-5: Cultural and/or community groups
may be used as links.(See Planning Diagram.).
Objective VIII: Resort group(s) must be designed
to make use of existing facilities within the town.
Reason VIII: Costs could be lowered since adherence
12 4
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to this objective would minimize the chances of unneces-
sary duplication of facilities and services. Finally this
objective would result in making the new design more in-
tegral with, or complementary to the existing urban fabric
thus minimizing the risks of creating alienation and
exclusiveness.
Strategy VIII-1: New facilities must be located
in accordance with the prevailing land-use patterns so
as not to create detrimental externalities. Hence noisy
facilities should not be placed adjacent to areas which
cherish quietude such as hospitals.
Strategy VIII-2: New facilities must rot be located
so as to disrupt vital community patterns ensuing from
various facilities.
In the SCP Plan for Montego Bay two churches (St.
John's Methodist Church and Holy Trinity Church) and
the city's market place will be demolished.
Strategy VIII-3: Re-zoning may be done in areas
where it will enhance the prevailing situation from the
viewpoint of the residents.
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SOME APPLICATIONS
Some of the ways in which the developed strategies
may be applied to the existing characteristics of Montego
Bay are as follows:-
1, Re-route traffic from Charles Square
2. Close some of the streets in the central
business district to vehicular traffic.
3. Re-examine and improve the public trans-
portation systems.
4, Assign areas for parking.
5. Integrate some of the more significant
areas existing (such as Charles Square
and the railroad terminal) with the target
area.
Re-routing Traffic
With all the new development which is to take place
soon in Montego Bay via the target area (described in
Chapter 4), it is most conceivable that vehicular traffic
is going to be much mgre congested within Charles Square.
Presently, studies are being made for alleviating this
situation because it is fmoving stifling to commercial ac-
tivity particularly in the Square, While some degree of
congestion is desirous for enhancing human interaction, too
high a degree serves to reduce this interaction as people
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begin to avoid such an area. This is what may happen to
Charles Square. Consequently, it becomes imperative for
vehicular traffic to be diverted from Charles Square.
Closing of Streets
Accompanying any plan for diverting vehicular traffic
from Charles Square should be the closing of the Square
itself to vehicular traffic,
Public Transportation System
Eliminating some of the streets require some examina-
tion on the part of the planner of ways for at least main-
taining good public transportation systems,
One way of attacking this problem is to redesign bus
routes and the direction of vehicular flow on streets.
For example, (a) new bus routes may become necessary in
some areas because of the inconvenience that may be caused
from closing some streets; (b) some streets may need to
be converted into one-way streets because of the subsequent
overstocking resulting from the closing of some streets,
Enough information is not presently available to
the writer for any recommendations to be made in terms
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of an architectural plan.
Parking Areas
Amenities have to be provided for people to park their
cars. Motor vehicles have been parked, for example, with-
in Charles Square. Since it is recommended that this area
be closed to all vehicles, then patrons need some place
to park their vehicles. Thus, one recommendation is that
parking garages (not surpassing three stories) be con-
structed as close as possible to areas of relatively high
commercial activity.
Integration of Some Existing Areas
With respect to Charles Square, its commercial charac-
ter could be continued in a very integral way into the de-
signed target area. This attempt would serve not to iso-
late such an important area of this resort city (Montego
Bay).
Besides integrating Charles Square with the designed
target area, since vehicular traffic is barred from it
there will be an empty central open space which could be
enhanced to be an area full with vitality. This central
space could become an open-air market place where crafts-
men, artists, fruit vendorametc., may sell their
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merchandises under colourful umbrella-like structures
which serve mainly to protect the vendors from sun and
rain but simultaneously add a sparkle of colour to what
may otherwise be a drab area. Some of the existing shops
surrounding the square may provide open-air eating also by
extending (under permission granted by the authority
concerned) into the central area.
South of Charles Square is the terminus of the
Jamaica Railway Corporation. This is the terminal point
for trains running between Kingston and Montego Bay. This
is an amenity which could be integrated into the tourist
atmosphere of Montego Bay.
Example: According to many reports and studies, it
seems apparent that many tourists would like to see quite
cheaply and reliably what areas outside of the resorts are
like. Encouraging tourists to ride these trains would
serve to minimize exclusiveness and the educational value
described in Chapter 3 could be realized.
One big reason why tourists are reluctant to try this
mode of transportation is due, in addition to this mode
not being advertised, to the squalid conditions which
depict the area around the terminus.
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One method of integrating such a vital element is by
rejuvenating the area surrounding the terminus by con-
structing new passenger waiting rooms, shops, restaurants,
offices, etc., (and probably a new market place typical
of those in Jamaica's past where fresh agricultural
products were sold) and linking them directly via the
existing commercial strip along St. James Street to Charles
Square. So, in a sense, Charles Square and this new ter-
minus would be the nuclei of a commercial strip between
these two points.
IMPIEMENTATION
In order to make these strategies useful, it is
necessary that provisions be made for their implementa-
tion. There needs to be a body or agency sanctioned by
the Government and given full powers as the only authority
for deciding what may or may not be implemented within or
as a resort development.
Figure 5-14 charts the different processes involved
in the approval-implementation process. The developer
will be required to employ an architect to prepare pre-
liminary design drawings for submission to the committee.
This committee will be comprised of five professional
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experts from the staff of the existing Town Planning
Department and the Urban Development Corporation--three
architect- planners, one regional economist, and one
structural engineer. Assisting this committee is an
ancillary staff of secretaries who will communicate the
committee's recommendations with respect to the submis--
sion(s) to the architect. Acting upon these recommenda-
tions the architect will incorporate the necessary items
into his final presentation drawings and submit them to
the Approval Committee. If the Approval Committee is not
satisfied with the development as described by the pre-
sentation drawings, it will inform the architect of what
corrections are necessary for approval. On rectifying
these drawings the architect will re-submit them to the
Approval Committee. If the drawings are approved then
the architect will be instructed to proceed with his
working drawings. These working drawings will go the same
route as the presentation drawings in order to obtain
final approval. If the working drawings are not passed
by the Approval Committee, then they will be returned to
the architect with a list of directions and recommenda-
tions from the Committee. The architect must make the
necessary changes before re-submitting his working draw-
ings. When the Approval Committee grants the final approval
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it will inform the architect (who, in turn, will inform his
client) and the Urban Development Corporation for that
body to see tb it that the project is constructed accord-
ing to the working drawings which were finally approved.
After studying the approval-implementation process,
it should be obvious that approval of individual projects
may be deleterious to the physical development of a resort
area in the long run. The reason behind this statement is
due to the microscopic view that the Approval Committee
would be employing. In other words, the committee would
be examining individual proposals or parts without any
concept of the whole. Thus in order to rectify such a
situation, the Planning Committee will be an ad hoc commit-
tee charged by the Covernment with the responsibility of
developing master plans based on the physical planning
strategies described in this chapter for various resort
areas throughout the island. The Approval Committee will
require that every proposal submitted to them must comply
with the master plan for its region.
The Planning Committee will be comprised of the Govern-
ment Town Planner (of the Town Planning Department), the
senior architect-planner of the Urban Development Corpora-
tion, and three other architect-planners from the private
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sector. The chairman of this committee will be one of the
three architect-planners from the private sector. An an-
cillary staff of civil engineer, draftsmen, and one or two
secretaries will be part of the Planning Committee.
Because of the fact that both the Town Planning Depart-
ment and the Urban Development Corporation presently exist
and are Governmentally empowered to approve real estate
developments--the Town Planning Development is responsible
for proposals which fall in or within and around towns of
cities and the Urban Development Corporation for those
proposals which fall into areas owned by it--it becomes
politically necessary that neither of these agencies be
given the upper hand in the process described in Figure
5-14. It is also economically necessary that a new agency
for planning, approving and implementing is not created as
unnecessary dupliction wil exist. These explanations
clarify the reason for drawing senior experts from both the
Urban Development Corporation and the Town Planning Depart-
ment. It is only in the area of implementation that one
of these agencies occur. The Urban Development Corporation
has been functioning from its inception as the regulatory
body for major urban and regional developments within
the island and especially in zesort areas. Therefore,
making the Urban Development Corporation solely
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responsible for implementation should not result in any
tipping of the political balance. Besides, the Urban
Development Corporation, to most extent, may be described
as politically neutral.
In discussing the implementation of the strategies
spelt out in this chapter, one question which will be
frequently asked is: What about the existing hotels; are
they to be demolished if they are not in compliance with
any of the strategies? The answer to this question is no,
as this would be uneconomical as well as impractical. Ex-
isting hotels or any other tourist facility which may cause
infringements of the new code of strategies may either be
ignored, but better still, be somewhat ingratiated into a
new pattern resulting from the employment of the strategies
so as to minimize exclusiveness.
To be specific, though, the possibility of implemen-
tating the strategies developed in this thesis should not
be difficult in the Montego Bay target area described in
Chapter 4. The principal reason for this is that the tar-
get area is comprised of sixty-four acres of almost entire-
ly virgin land. The social and economic burden of reloca-
tion will not exist for this area. The capital outlays
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will not be at the usually high level as the entire area
will be divided into much smaller lots than those proposed
in the SCP Plan. Thus, many more Jamaicans may invest in
the resort development. By making the subdivisions small,
investment will not be limited only tp expatriates and
high-income Jamaicans but also to the below middle-income
Jamaicans assuming that mortgages are made available by
the Government through any of its financial institutions.
It must be the policy of Government that Jamaican citizens
be given first preferences in owning the lots.
As of now, the UDC has been charged by the Govern-
ment to be the administrator of the target area during
its development phase. The UDC will develop the target
area and then finally dispense of its holdings. An alter-
native to this activity is not recommended by the writer.
Consequently, there will not be any conflict with the
UDC's present responsibility in this initial phase.
If there is greater Jamaican participation in terms
of ownership then the nation would be heading in the right
direction in minimizing exclusiveness. The enormous cash
outlays required in owning a tourist facility (especially
hotels) have been the principal obstacle to high rates of
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Jamaican ownership. This can be eliminated if the
tourist facilities are built on a "condominium" princi-
ple. Thus every facility will have its own title and may
be bought or rented with an option to buy. The success in
terms of Jamaican ownership, of the Turtle Beach Towers in
Ocho Rios which was built on the "condominium" principle
is an example which could be duplicated in Montego Bay.
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CHAPTER ONE
1. Jamaica Tourist Board and the Jamaica Information
Service, "Our Tourist Industry" in Facts on Jamaica,
p.3.
2. Ibid., p. 3.
3. Ibid., p. 4.
4. In Jamaica the Jamaica dollar is worth more than its
American counterpart. US$1.OO = J$0.88
5. Owen Jefferson, The Post-War Economic Development of
Jamaica, Instituta of Social and Economic eearch,
University of the West Indies (1972), p. 172.
6. Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics:
Jamaica 1972, p. 4.
7. Owen Jefferson, op. cit., p. 4.
8. Jamaica Tourist Board, op.c p. 4.
9. Jefferson, op. cit., p. 173.
10. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 4.
11. Jefferson, op. cit., p. 173
12. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 18.
13. This year, 1972, represents the last year for which
statistics are available.
14. A "long-stay" tourist is defined as one who remains
in the island for three nights or more.
15. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 18.
16. Jamaica Tourist Board and the Jamaica Information
Service., op. cit., p. 18.
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17. Jefferson, op. cit., p. 190.
18. Refer to Table 1.6 for the sources of these figures.
19. Norman Girvan, et al., "Unemployment in Jamaica",
Readings in the Political Economy of the Garibbean,
New World (1971), p. 267.
20. The figures describing the employment picture do not
tell the whole story. For instance, there is nei-
ther any indication of the extent of underemployment
nor any suggestion of the number of people in the
labour force who have never worked. Using the 1960
Census figures, Girvan noted that during a time of a
six-day-work-week almost one out of every four men
worked for four days or less. For the women the
underemployment rate was just over twenty per cent.
21. National Planning Agency, Economic Survey:
Jamaica 1972. Government oTJamaica, p. 65
22. The sugar industry is Jamaica's single highest em-
ployer.
23. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 4.
24. Owen Jefferson, op. cit., p. 174
25. Jamaica Tourist Board, OP. cit., p. 4.
26. These figures are calculated from officially publish-
ed figures.
27. Jefferson, op. cit., p. 174.
28. This organization was formed in 1974 after the ma-
jprity of the producers realized how foreign com-
panies were exploiting their bauxite and seeing how
effective the Arabs were in their formation of a
petroleum cartel (OPEC).
29. Donald E. Lundberg, The Tourist Business, Institu-
tions/Volume Feeding Management Magazine (1972).
30. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 12
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31. Town Planning Department, A National Physical Plan
For Jamaica Government of Jamaica (1971), p. 36.
32. Ibid., p. 36.
33. Ibid., p. 38.
34. Ibid., p. 38.
CHAPTER TWO
1. Donald E. Lundberg, The Tourist Business Institutions/
Volume Feeding Management Magazine (19723.
2. Some of these reports have appeared in various news-
papers such as the New York Times, (USA) The Daily
Gleaner (Jamaica), and also in Lundberg's book, The
Tourist Business, op. cit.,
3. In Jamaica, no less than eighty per cent of the tour-
ists during the last six years have come from the
United States.
4. The National Income per capita, the Personal Income
per capita, and the personal Consumption expenditure
per capita, were reported to be J$514.5, J$486.5, and
J$462.4 respectively.
5. Jamaica Tourist Board, Inns of Jamaica.
6. The Jamaica Daily News, August 18, 1974.
7. National Planning Agency, Economic Survey:Jamaica 1972,
Government of Jamaica, p. 61.
8. Norman Girvan and Owen Jefferson (editors), Readings
in the Political Economy of the Caribbean, Nw World
Group Ltd. (1971), p. 266.
9. These figures are calculated from the information
published by the Government in the Economic Survey:
Jamaica 1972, p. 134
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10. These figures were also calculated from a Govern-
ment source, Economic Survey:Jamaica 1972, p. 134.
11. Such a benefit was established by the Jamaican Govern-
ment in order to promote the tourist industry. Under
this legislation there is an In-Bond Merchants Associ-
ation (established under the aegis of the Government)
which ensures the protection of the patrons.
12. This survey was carried out by the Town Planning De-
partment and financed by the United Nations.
13. K. Norris, Jamaica:The Search for an Indentity, Insti-
tute of Race Relations, Oxford (1962).
14. Town Planning Department, The National Atlas of Jamai-
ca, Government of Jamaica (1971), p. 77.
15. Ibid., p. 77.
16. This is calculated from figures published by various
Governmental agencies.
17. Town Planning Department, The National Atlas of Jamai-
ca, Government of Jamaica T197l), p. /7.
18. Brian Hudson, "Development on the Jamaican Coast", in
The Daily Gleaner, Tuesday, January 22, 1974.
CHAPTER THREE
1. H. Peter Gray, International Travel International
Td Health Lexington Books (19705, p. 157
2. Donald E. Lundberg, The Tourist Business, Institutions/
Volume Feeding Management Magazine(1972), p. 127.
3. Gray, op. cit., 158.
4. Ibid, p. 158
5. Ibid., p. 158
6. Lundberg, op. cit.
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7. Jamaica gained its Independence on August 6, 1962.
8. Frederick W. Ilfeld, Jnr., "Environmental Theories of
Violence". In David N. Daniels, et al. (Eds.),Violence
and the Struggle for Existence LiTte, Brown ad
Company (Inc.), 1970. p. 6B
9. Ibid., p. 86,
10. Ibid., p. 86.
11. Description of some of these incidents have appeared in
such newspapers as the New York Times, and the Daily
Gleaner, Lundberg, (The Tourist Business), and Bryden
(Tourismand Development)have also made some reference
to these incidents.
12. This figure is calculated from the reports made by the
Tourist Board.
13. Calculated from data published by the Jamaica Tourist
Board.
14. Calculated from data published by the Jamaica Tourist
Board.
15. John M. Bryden, Tourism and Development: A Case Study
of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Cambridge University
Press (1973), p. 100.
16. Ibid., p. 100.
17. Lundberg, op. cit., p. 192.
18. See Chapter 1 of this thesis.
19. These months are characterized principally by a high
influx of young tourists of modest means such as
teachers, secretaries, and other clerical workers.
20. Bryden, op. cit., p. 132.
21. "Leakages" may be defined as that sum of money which
evaporates from or leaves the economy as profits,
savings, and various purchases of imports.
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22. Owen Jefferson, the Post-War Economic Development of
Jamaica, Institute of Social and Economic Research,
University of the West Indies (1972), p. 179.
23. Ibid., p. 178.
24. Ibid., p. 178.
25. Ibid., p. 178.
26. The Jamaican Parliament has recently passed a bill
making the unofficial channelling of money out of the
country illegal. Thus, there should be a recustion of
the leakages via this route.
CHAPTER FOUR
1. The census figures for 1960 and 1970 are 23,600 and
42,800 people respectively.
2. The only two towns which had higher growth rates were
Spanish Town (the former capital of the country) with
11.0 per cent and May Pen with 6.4 per sent.
3. Town Planning Department, Government of Jamaica, The
National Atlas of Jamaica, p. 10.
4. Ibid, p. 12.
5. Ibid., p. 12.
6. Ibid., p. 13.
7. Ibid., p. 13.
8. "Long stay" tourists are defined as those visitors who
remain in Jamaica for three nights or more.
9. Jamaica Tourist Board, Travel Statistics: Jamaica 1972
p. 12.
10. The tourist population increases at a rate of more
than 1.7 times that of the resident population.
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11. "Short stay" tourists are defined as those visitors who
stay in the island for less than three nights. "Stop-
overs", on the other hand, are the total of long-stay
and short-stay tourists (i.e. visitors staying over-
night or longer).
12. This figure is calculated from figures published by the
Jamaica Tourist Board in their report op. cit. 12.
13. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 29.
14. Jamaica Tourist Board and the Jamaica Information Ser-L
vice, Facts on Jamaica: Our Tourist Industry, p. 13.
15. Jamaica Tourist Board, op. cit., p. 3.
16. Calculations are made from official statistics fur-
nished by the Tourist Board.
17. Town Planning Department, Government of Jamaica, A
National Physical Plan for Jamaica 1970-1990, p. 38.
18. This is the acronym for the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries.
19. Town Planning Department, Government of Jamaica, A
National Physical Plan for Jamaica 1970-1990, p.47.
20. Shankland Cox Partnership, Montego Bay, Jamaica:
Development of the Waterfront-The ction Area.
21. This plan has already been described in the previous
chapter (Chapter 4).
22. The word "exclusiveness" has been defined in Chapter 2.
23. By this the writer is describing those facilities which
generate participation of the local people.
24. Shankland Cox Partnership, Montego Bay, Jamaica.
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CHAPTER FIVE
1. The basic needs are considered to be sleeping and
eating.
2. An isolated hotel is considered to be one which is
highly independent because of its distance from hotel-
related facilities.
3. A distinction is made between "dining" and "snacking".
"Dining" implies a formal meal with the various courses,
while "snacking" is self-explanatroy.
4. See the preceding note (Note 3).
5. The degree of congestion necessary for an area to be
classified as "congested" should be mutually decided
upon by the Parish Council, the Urban Development Cor-
poration, and the Town Planning Department.
6. In the case of Montego Bay, noisy Lacilities should be
kept away from the new St. James Regional Hospital
which is on the waterfront and near the boundary of the
target area described in Chapter 4.
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